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ABSTRACT
The Tohoku Shinkansen is a high-speed passenger train running along the eastern side of
Honshu, the largest of the Japanese islands. The line is about 496km long and links
Tokyo to the northern city of Morioka. A seismic early warning system (SEWS) has been
in operation since 1978 with the purpose of mitigating the consequences of large
destructive earthquakes. The SEWS includes two networks of accelerometers, one along
the line (wayside system) and the other dislocated along the eastern coast of Honshu
(coastal system), practically midway between the Tohoku line and the highly active
offshore seismic sources. By activating the emergency braking system, the SEWS can
reduce the distance traveled by trains on potentially damaged tracks, thus reducing the
risk of derailments. The current SEWS is however causing a large number of train delays
and the level of earthquake protection it provides is unclear. The present study quantifies
the current level of seismic risk and indicates ways in which the SEWS can be made more
efficient, reducing the rate of earthquake-induced derailments and at the same time
reducing the rate of false alarms, unnecessary delays, train cancellations, e.t.c.
The derailment risk is estimated at 2-3 derailments every 100 years over the entire line
with the current SEWS. This figure is however influenced greatly by the attenuation
model, the local soil conditions and the seismic fragility of the viaduct structure, all of
which are uncertain. Changing the way in which the current coastal system operates does
not improve the effectiveness of the SEWS by significant amounts. By contrast, changing
the seismic intensity parameter used to trigger various actions at the wayside system from
peak ground acceleration (used now) to response spectrum acceleration is quite effective.
The recommended new setting of the operational parameters for the wayside and coastal
systems is estimated to reduce the expected rate of derailment by a factor of 2 and the rate
of SEWS-induced delays by a factor of about 40.
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coastal systems A, B and C and (atoc, Ai inspAinsp2) = (40, 80, 120gals), if:
(a) soil type is I, II, III (Table 4.2) all along the line
(b) maximum velocity, Vo = 210Okmh, 245kmh(base-case value), 300kmh
[Figure corresponds to cases illustrated in Figure 6.9]
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Figure I-9: Annual rates of derailments and various delays, including derailment 168
risk due to resumption of operation following short delays for
coastal systems A, B and C and (at oc Ainspl, Ainsp2)=(40, 80, 120gals), if:
(a) Mmax of each seismic source is 0.5 higher/lower relative to base-case value
(b) b-value of each seismic source is 0.9, 1.1 or base-case value
[Figure corresponds to cases illustrated in Figure 6.11]
Figure 1-10: Annual rates of derailments and various delays, including derailment 169
risk due to resumption of operation following short delays for
coastal systems A, B and C and (atO , Ainsp, Ainsp2) = (40, 80, 120gals) for:
the UrEDAS system accuracy of P-wave estimation of:
(a) earthquake magnitude M: aM,P = 0.5, 1.0(base-case value)
(b) epicentral distance A:caA,P = 25%A, 75%A(base-case value), 100%A
[Figure corresponds to cases illustrated in Figure 6.12]
Figure I-11: Conditional probability P[EIM, x, s, B] of event E along the line, 170
for (b, at,loc, Ainspi, Ainsp2) = (40, 40, 80, 120gals) and earthquake
magnitudes M = 5 - 9, [epicenter: 571 km from s= and 135km from s=26]
(a) E = derailment, (b) E = short delay,
(c) E = medium delay,(d) E = long delay.
[Figure similar to Figure 6.13, but for coastal system B]
Figure 1-12: Conditional probability P[EIM, x, s, C] of event E along the line, 171
for (c , tloc, Ainspl, Ainsp2) = (3.0, 40gals, 80gals, 120gals) and earthquake
magnitudes M = 5 - 9, [epicenter: 571km from s=l and 135km from s=26]
(a) E = derailment, (b) E = short delay,
(c) E = medium delay,(d) E = long delay.
[Figure similar to Figure 6.13, but for coastal system C]
Figure II-1: Model line, train and station locations and potential epicenters 178
of earthquakes used in the study of propagation of delay along the line
[Figure for train frequency of 1 train per segment]
Figure II-2: Assumed recorded values of peak ground acceleration 179
along the model line for M = 5-8, compared to track inspection levels:
Ainspl=80gals and Ainsp2= l20gals, for epicentral distances:
(a) D=60km, (b) D=lOOkm and (c) D=140km.
Figure 11-3: Train location versus time after resumption of service of trains 180
according to current track inspection levels: Ainspt=80gals and Ainsp2=120gals.
for earthquake of M=7 at D=60km.
[1. Figure presents half the total track and half the trains due to symmetry,
2. Figure for train frequency of 1 train per segment]
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Introduction and Objectives
The Tohoku Shinkansen is a high-speed passenger train running along the eastern side of
Honshu, the largest of the Japanese islands; see Figure 1.1. The line is about 496 km long
and links Tokyo to the northern city of Morioka, with 14 intermediate stations. The
Tohoku Shinkansen is operated by Japanese Railways East (JREast), one of the railway
companies that emerged from the privatization of the previously state-owned railways.
Although the Tohoku line does not cross any major known seismogenic area, it is
potentially vulnerable to moderate local seismicity and to the more frequent and more
intense earthquakes that originate in the subduction zone off the eastern coast of Japan.
Seismic risk has long been a concern, not just in the design but also in the operation of
the Tohoku Shinkansen. Regarding the latter, a seismic early warning system (SEWS)
has been in operation since 1978 with the purpose of mitigating the consequences of large
destructive earthquakes. The SEWS includes two networks of accelerometers, one along
the line, the other dislocated along the eastern coast of Honshu, roughly midway between
the Tohoku line and the more active offshore seismic sources. The purpose of the SEWS
is to provide early detection of arriving seismic waves, thus allowing early emergency
braking of the trains. The most feared accidents are those associated with derailments,
which under seismic conditions occur mainly when a running train encounters a damaged
section of the track. Through early braking, the SEWS reduces the distance travelled by
trains on potentially damaged tracks and therefore reduces the risk of severe accidents.
Several issues have been raised about the effectiveness of the SEWS system. Specifically,
questions have been posed on whether the effectiveness of the system could be improved:
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1. by modifying the way in which the system operates,
2. by modifying the earthquake intensity parameters used to trigger emergency
train stopping (the parameter currently used at both the coastal and
wayside accelerometers is peak ground acceleration, ama),
3. by changing the level of seismic intensity at which various actions are taken
(emergency braking, track inspection, resumption of operation).
The problem is not just to achieve the maximum possible level of earthquake protection,
but to balance safety with the monetary and non-monetary costs associated with false
alarms, long delays, train cancellations, e.t.c.
Studies on seismic early warning systems around the world include the following
Fujiwara et al.(1980), a study of a system which was at the time under development for
the Tohoku Shinkansen and performed a three-point estimation of earthquake magnitude
and epicentral location, Heaton (1985), a study of a system that performs an estimation of
location, time of origin and amplitude of ground shaking through information from a
dense array of broadband seismometers, Nakamura (1988 and 1989), studies of a system
named UrEDAS which performs a single-point estimation of earthquake magnitude and
epicentral location. These studies present technical characteristics and the triggering
philosophy of these early warning systems but they do not include estimates of
cost/benefit effectiveness of these systems in actual applications.
The objectives of the present study are to quantify the level of seismic safety of the
Tohoku line and to compare the effectiveness of alternative SEWS systems and SEWS
operational strategies. From the results of this study, we have derived a set of
recommendations on the most efficient way to operate the early warning system. In
essence, we have found that:
1. by changing the way in which the current system operates one can gain only
minor improvements in seismic effectiveness;
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2. changing the intensity parameters used to trigger various actions (we
specifically propose to replace ama to response spectrum acceleration Sa at
an appropriate frequency and damping ratio) produces significant
improvements in the sense of reducing both the rate of earthquake-induced
derailments and the rate of train delays and potential cancellations;
3. changing the levels of seismic intensity at which various actions take place
(emergency braking, track inspection, resumption of service) also
produces significant improvements over the current operation of the
system.
Another set of recommendations is reached in this study regarding the reduction of
uncertainty on the actual level of seismic risk. We have found that seismic safety of the
Tohoku Shinkansen is particularly sensitive to: (a) seismic attenuation and local
attenuation effects and (b) earthquake vulnerability of the viaduct structure that supports
most of the line. Both elements are at present time highly uncertain. We suggest that
JREast undertakes additional studies to reduce these uncertainties. Such studies could
also lead to the identification of segments of the line that are especially vulnerable to
earthquakes and that should be retrofitted on a priority basis. The Tohoku line is
primarily subjected to destructive earthquakes originating in the subduction zone off the
eastern coast of Honshu while the inland seismicity is comparatively less significant. This
is the reason that led us to consider only the offshore seismicity in this study.
Chapter 2 of this thesis describes the Tohoku Shinkansen as a transportation and
structural system and gives the main characteristics of the current SEWS system and its
historical performance. Alternative coastal and wayside SEWS systems are discussed in
Chapter 3. The seismic environment of the Tohoku Shinkansen is characterized in
Chapter 4 in terms of earthquake recurrence laws and seismic attenuation models,
including local amplification effects. Chapter 5 presents the general methodology used in
this study to evaluate earthquake risk. This includes a description of the seismic
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vulnerability of the viaduct structure which is an element of primary importance in
determining seismic risk. Numerical results are presented in Chapter 6, where the
performance of the SEWS is estimated, the main factors contributing to seismic risk are
identified and uncertainty on the actual level of risk is quantified. Chapter 7 presents a
detailed numerical comparison of the various seismic early warning systems under
different operational policies. Specific recommendations to JREast for the future
operation of the system and proposed areas of further study are included in Chapter 8.
Appendix I presents additional risk results that are complementary to results included in
Chapters 6 and 7. Appendix II addresses the issue of propagation of delay along the
Tohoku line.
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The Tohoku Shinkansen and the Present SEWS
2.1 The Tohoku Shinkansen
The Tohoku Shinkansen travels not on an embankment as most conventional lines in
Japan do, but on a continuous viaduct structure except, for tunnels in rocky parts of the
line. The viaduct is a reinforced concrete-continuous beam frame structure that carries a
double track. The typical span between piers is 7 meters and the height of the structure
ranges between 7 and 14 meters, with a typical value of 10 m; see Figure 2.1.
An important parameter for the seismic behavior of the structure is the natural period of
vibration of the viaduct, T, which has been estimated by JREast (personal
communication) as shown in Table 2.1. The values of T in the table correspond to
horizontal vibration in the direction perpendicular to the track. According to JREast
engineers, vibration in the vertical and horizontal directions may be considered harmless
to the viaduct; these components of motion are therefore ignored in the present study.
A second important parameter in the study of seismic vulnerability is the displacement of
the deck relative to the ground, d, at which the column pier or the upper beam yield.
JREast engineers have estimated these values of d as given in Table 2.2, for different
viaduct heights.
Earthquake loads on the viaduct structure are influenced significantly by the local
geologic/soil conditions along the line. Such local conditions may amplify or de-amplify
the ground motion relative to standard (e.g. bedrock). Table 2.3 presents a crude soil
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classification along the Tohoku Shinkansen line. In this table, N is the representative
SPT-value for the material above bedrock and t is the thickness of the soil layer. The soil
classes in Table 2.3 correspond to those used for seismic design of the viaduct structure
and are defined in Table 2.4. Specifically, the soil coefficient is the one used in the design
of the viaduct structure to scale the seismic design relative to "normal" conditions. It
should be kept in mind that, this soil coefficient is only a rough estimate of the local
amplification effects and that in reality amplification (or de-amplification) may vary
substantially along the line depending on specific local conditions.
Next we mention a few miscellaneous characteristics of the Tohoku line which will be
used later in the analysis of seismic safety:
* Location and extent of tunnels : The line includes a total of 115 tunnels, which range in
length from 20 to 11,705 meters. Most of the tunnels are shorter than 1,000 m and their
aggregate length is 116,450 m or 23% of the total length of the line. Table 2.5 gives the
total length and number of tunnels within each of 26 non-overlapping track segments into
which the line is divided. The segments correspond to operational track units and are
associated each to one of the 26 wayside accelerometers. A more detailed description of
this system will be given in section 2.2. The distance from Tokyo reported in Table 2.5 is
the distance along the track of the starting location of the track segment.
* Frequency of train passages : The frequency of train operation varies with track
segment and time of day, as reported in Table 2.6. Notice that Sendai station is
approximately 325 km from Tokyo. The Shinkansen trains are on average 250 m long
and their operational speed is at the moment set at 245 kmh. Assuming an average speed
of 200 kmh (including occasional stops at stations along the line) and using the frequency
data in Table 2.6, one concludes that, at a generic point in time, the expected number of
trains between Tokyo and Sendai is 11.47 and between Sendai and Morioka is 2.95.
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As was mentioned briefly above and as described in detail in Section 2.2, the track is
divided into 26 segments, which are relevant to the operational control of the wayside
earthquake detection system. The track section from Tokyo to Sendai (T-S) includes 16
segments while that from Sendai to Morioka (S-M) is divided into 10 segments.
Assigning a uniform train density in each of these two track sections, the expected
number of trains per segment is 0.72 from Tokyo to Sendai and 0.30 from Sendai to
Morioka. This change in train density will be found to be a factor in the variability of risk
along the Tohoku line.
The aforementioned characteristics provide a physical and technical picture of the
Tohoku Shinkansen as a transportation system. For the protection of this transportation
system against earthquakes, JREast is operating a Seismic Early Warning System
(SEWS) that automatically induces a train to stop when a potentially destructive
earthquake is detected at a wayside or coastal seismic station. The present study focuses
on the risk reduction capabilities of this system and the optimization of its future
operation. The next section gives a detailed description of the exact purpose,
configuration and operation of the present SEWS.
2.2 The Present Seismic Early Warning System (SEWS)
Before the Tohoku Shinkansen, other Shinkansen lines in Japan had been provided with a
seismic early warning system. The Tokaido Shinkansen had such a system as early as
1966. The concept of SEWS had been around also before that time, but it was the
disastrous Niigata earthquake of 1964 that promoted its development. Based on the
experience gained from the Tokaido and Sanyo Shinkansen, a new SEWS was developed
for the Tohoku Shinkansen, which became operational in 1978. This is the system
described here. Very recently, the effectiveness of the existing system has been
questioned and alternative schemes have been proposed. Possible changes will be
described in detail in Chapter 3.
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The earthquake activity in the region surrounding the Tohoku line may be broadly
divided into offshore Pacific Ocean seismicity and inland seismicity. This division can be
observed in the map of earthquake epicenters, shown in Figure 2.2. Offshore earthquakes
contribute 80% to 90% of the earthquake occurrence rate in the area and are often of
larger magnitude. However, these events occur at a distance of at least 80-100 km from
the line and therefore are subjected to higher attenuation. These characteristics of the
regional seismicity motivate the following philosophy of the seismic early warning
system for the Tohoku Shinkansen:
(1) Protect against offshore earthquakes is obtained through a coastal earthquake
detection;
(2) Protect against inland earthquakes through accelerometers installed along the
track.
The wayside accelerometers operate also as a second line of defense against offshore
earthquakes that might not be triggered by the coastal stations. Moreover, the intensity of
ground motion recorded at the wayside stations is the basis for operational decisions
about post-earthquake track inspection and resumption of service. The way in which the
coastal and wayside systems operate is described next in greater detail.
(1) Coastal System
Accelerometers are installed on rock at eight (8) coastal locations, chosen to provide the
longest lead time possible at the track for offshore earthquakes; see Figure 1.1. At
present, the accelerometers are set to trigger when a pre-specified level of peak ground
acceleration is exceeded. The eight locations are: Hachinoche, Miyako, Ofunato,
Kinkasan, Soma, Iwaki, Choshi and Miura peninsula. A ninth accelerometer is located
along the track at Shinnogi and is operated as part of the coastal system. This last location
was chosen to provide trains running in the central portion of the line with lead time
relative to inland earthquakes from the area south of Tokyo. As mentioned before, this
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analysis takes considers the risk from the offshore seismicity only, therefore this ninth
accelerometer is not taken into account.
In the current early warning system, each coastal accelerometer controls a preset track
segment, as shown in Figure 1.1. Therefore, as the horizontal ground acceleration at a
coastal station exceeds the chosen threshold level (currently, 40 gals), emergency braking
is automatically activated for all trains running in the corresponding track segment.
(2) Wayside Sstem
The wayside system consists of 26 accelerometers installed at nearly equal intervals
between Tokyo and Morioka. The locations correspond to substations (S.S), section
points (S.P) and subsection points (S.S.P), all of which have a dual role: (a) detect the
incoming earthquake strong motion and possibly cause trains in the adjacent segments to
stop, and (b) measure the intensity of the ground motion close to the line, to decide upon
post-earthquake actions. Because the average spacing between the accelerometers is 20
km, each wayside station controls trains over a track segment of about 40 km. In a
simplifying approximation, it is assumed in the present analysis that each location along
the line is controlled by only one wayside accelerometer. Therefore, the track is divided
into 26 non-overlapping segments. We refer to such non-overlapping segments as
operational track segments. The location of the starting point of these operational
segments is provided, with other information, in Table 2.5. At present, the wayside
instruments are set to trigger emergency train braking when the local peak ground
acceleration exceeds 40 gals.
Historical Operation of the SEWS
During the period from 1982 to the end of 1993, the seismic early warning system
triggered in 144 earthquakes: the coastal system alone issued 63 warnings, the wayside
system triggered alone 54 times, while the two systems triggered simultaneously in 27
cases. The 144 events in which the SEWS was triggered resulted in the following
consequences for the operation of Shinkansen trains:
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(a) There were 31 trains that did not resume regular operation after being stopped by
the SEWS. This was due to the fact that track inspection was considered
necessary. This number corresponds to a rate of 2.82 stopped trains/year.
(b) There were 796 trains that were delayed but were allowed to resume operation
after being stopped by the SEWS. This number corresponds to a rate of 72.36
delayed trains/year.
The temporal distribution of these stopped and delayed trains is far from uniform within
the 11 years of the record. Specifically, all 31 stopped trains were stopped during 1993.
Moreover, during 1983, 1987 and 1993 the SEWS caused 116, 112 and 186 train delays
respectively, while during 1982 and 1991 the numbers of delayed trains were 24 and 19
respectively.
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H (m) 7.0 8.5 10.0 12.0 14.0
T (sec) 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.36
Table 2.1: Natural period of horizontal vibration T of the viaduct structure, as a function
of viaduct height H.
Table 2.2: Estimated horizontal relative displacement d of the viaduct structure when the
piers or the upper beam of the viaduct yield or fail, as a function of height H.
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H(m) d(cm) failure mode
7.0 2.2 column pier failure
8.5 3.1 column pier yielding
8.5 5.2 upper beam yielding
10.0 3.1 upper beam yielding
10.0 3.4 column pier yielding
12.0 4.1 upper beam yielding
14.0 2.0 upper beam yielding
Table 2.3: Soil classification along the Tohoku Shinkansen line.
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Section ( km from Tokyo) Length (kmn) Soil Type (see Table 2.4)
3- 13 10 II
13 - 30 17 III
30 - 37 7 II
37 - 43 6 III
43 - 51 8II
51 - 61.5 10.5 III
61.5- 100 38.5 II
100- 181 81 
181 - 263 82 II
263 - 293 30 II
293 - 298 5 III
298 - 329 31 II
329 -335 6 III
335 - 356 21 II
356 - 367 11 III
367 - 498 131 II
Table 2.4: Soil classification used in the seismic design of the viaduct structure.
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Soil Type Soil Name Soil Description Ground Coefficient
I Rock Tertiary and 0.8
pretertiary rock
II Normal Dilluvium or 1.0
alluvium(except soft
alluvium)
II Soft N=0 and t > 2m 1.2
N<3 and t > 5m
N<5 and t > 1 im
Track Distance from Segment Length Soil Type Length in No. of
Segment Tokyo (km) (kin) (Table 2.4) Tunnel (kin) Tunnels
1 0.000 3.875 II 2.052 2
2 3.875 8.228 II 1.495 1
3 12.103 14.440 II 0.585 1
4 26.543 14.641 II 0.000 0
5 41.184 15.964 II 0.000 0
6 57.148 23.060 II 0.000 0
7 80.208 25.282 II 0.000 0
8 105.490 25.726 II 1.019 2
9 131.216 22.420 II 1.145 4
10 153.636 23.523 II 10.862 6
11 177.159 23.667 III 11.230 18
12 200.826 22.124 II 0.000 0
13 222.950 22.427 II 16.150 11
14 245.377 24.726 II 0.692 1
15 270.103 26.466 II 17.624 9
16 296.569 16.735 II 10.826 12
17 313.304 15.667 II 0.000 0
18 328.971 21.078 I 9.308 14
19 350.049 18.280 I 3.170 9
...... .. ... _ . ..
20 368.329 19.204 I 3.140 7
21 387.533 26.902 I 17.588 8
22 414.435 21.551 II 6.656 8
23 435.986 18.850 III 0.000 0
24 454.836 19.042 II 2.908 2
25 473.878 15.541 III 0.000 0
26 489.419 7.061 II 0.000 0
Table 2.5: Soil type, number and aggregate length of tunnels by track segment.
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Table 2.6: Frequency of train operation, per track section and time of day. The frequency
includes both southbound and northbound trains.
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Time Range Tokyo-Sendai (trains / hr) Sendai-Morioka (trains / hr)
06:00 - 12:00 10 4.5
12:00- 18:00 10 6
18:00- 24:00 8.2 3.3
Vt 
Figure 2.1: Sketch of Tohoku Shinkansen viaduct.
34
Chapter 3
Alternative SEWS systems
The performance of the current seismic early warning system appears sub-optimal in
several respects. First, the trigger levels of the system are causing on average six trains
every month to be delayed from schedule because they are stopped unnecessarily.
Furthermore, the system causes one train every four months not to resume immediately
regular operation to allow for track inspection; see section 2.2. This average rate of train
delays and stops is considered high for a system that has never experienced any
earthquake-induced accident. To remedy the current inefficiency of the seismic early
warning system we study the effect of changing three different aspects of the SEWS:
First, the scope of control of each of the coastal accelerometers, then the intensity
parameter used at the wayside detecting systems for issuing warnings and deciding post-
earthquake resumption of train operation, and finally the trigger levels of both detecting
systems. Regarding the first issue, we consider three different coastal systems A, B and
C. System A is the current system, while systems B and C implement the potential for
any of the coastal accelerometers to order emergency braking of trains anywhere along
the Tohoku line, if the level of ground shaking calls for such an action. This kind of
operational rules are hereafter referred to as continuous rules. The difference between
systems B and C is that the latter assumes that at the location of each of the coastal
accelerometers there will be the potential for issuing an earlier warning, i.e. upon the
arrival of the P waves. The system that is capable of performing such an early operation
is called UrEDAS; see Nakamura (1988 and 1989). Another important aspect that
controls the performance of the seismic early warning system is the intensity parameter
used at the wayside system. In this study we study the efficiency of the system by using
either peak ground acceleration, as is currently performed, or alternatively response
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spectrum acceleration at an appropriate frequency and damping ratio. Finally, we study
the effect of different trigger levels of both coastal and wayside systems in the overall
performance of the SEWS system.
In describing alternative system configurations, we use the following notations:
i = generic coastal accelerometer (any of eight accelerometers),
j = location along the track,
s = operational track segment (a subset of locations j that are simultaneously
controlled in terms of the operation of the SEWS; any of the twenty-six
operational segments),
M = earthquake magnitude (JMA),
x = epicentral location,
A = epicentral distance from x to the location of interest j along the track,
ax = peak ground acceleration.
Sa = maximum acceleration experienced by a 1-DOF structure with a given natural
period T and damping ratio P. Sa is referred to as response spectrum
acceleration.
General characteristics of all SEWS systems considered here are:
(1) The coastal system can cause a train in operational segment s to brake until complete
stop. The coastal system operates on S waves (systems A and B) or, for system C on
either P or S waves.
(2) The wayside system can order a train in segment s to stop upon the arrival of the S
waves at track segment s.
37
(3) Braking orders are generated four seconds after the first arrival of the wave phase of
interest (P or S), at the site of the accelerometer. Indeed, four seconds into the motion is
typical of the time when the peak ground shaking intensity is reached; see for example
Murakami et al. (1975), Ejiri et al.(1988) and Der Kiureghian et al. (1989).
(4) Seismic waves are assumed to propagate isotropically and at constant and isotropic
velocity. The velocity of the S waves, Vs is assumed equal to 3.80 km/sec (JREast,
personal communication). Based on elastic wave theory (Gubbins, 1990), the velocity of
the P waves, Vp is related to Vs as
Vp= s (3.1)
where X, are the Lame constants. Since a reasonable assumption is that X = p in the
crust (Gubbins, 1990), equation (3.1) gives Vp = 6.58 km/sec.
3.1 Alternative Coastal Seismic Early Warning Systems
System A
This is the system that is currently in operation. It assigns a specific track segment to each
of the eight coastal accelerometers, as shown in Figure 1.1. These eight preset sections,
hereafter referred to as "shut-down" sections, cover the entire line with some overlap.
Each "shut-down" section is composed of neighboring operational segments; see Table
3.1. The principle underlying this system is that when the earthquake motion at a coastal
accelerometer exceeds a preset intensity, then the earthquake is considered potentially
dangerous for the corresponding "shut-down" section. A limitation of this system is that,
if one of the coastal accelerometers records high ground motion levels, it should be able
to trigger automatic braking also outside its designated proximal track section. Doing so
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could increase significantly the lead time of warning at locations along the line far away
from the coastal station.
System A operates on S waves and triggers automatic braking when peak ground
acceleration exceeds a threshold value a, which is currently set at 40gals. In analyzing
seismic risk under system A, we shall make the simplifying assumption that, if an
operational segment s can be controlled by more than one coastal station, in an
earthquake of given epicentral location it is actually controlled by the coastal station that
is closest to the epicenter.
System B
This system maintains the geographic configuration of the coastal accelerometers of
system A, but introduces a new operational philosophy. In this case there is no preset
"shut-down" section assigned to each coastal accelerometer. Rather, it is the intensity of
the earthquake motion recorded at the station and a roughly estimated epicentral location
area that determines the length of the "shut-down" section. Therefore, as the recorded
intensity increases the "shut-down" section of the track becomes larger. Compared to
system A, system B aims at gaining lead time for the braking of trains, as such action can
be caused at all locations along the track by the coastal accelerometer closest to the
epicenter, if the recorded ground motion intensity justifies such action.
Implementation of this system requires the definition of a set of trigger ground
acceleration levels at each coastal station i, which depend on track location s and on the
"sector of origin" of the earthquake R. The latter is defined as the subset seismogenic
regions that is closest to each coastal accelerometer; see Figure 3.1. These trigger
accelerations at have the form:
at(i,s,R)=b y (i,s,R) (3.2)
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where b* is a scaling factor with units of acceleration and y(i, s, R) is ideally the ratio
between the peak ground acceleration at coastal detector i and the spectral acceleration at
track segment s, for earthquakes that occur within "sector of origin" R. Because the above
ratio is uncertain and further depends on magnitude M and on the actual epicentral
location x within R, y is evaluated as follows:
Mmax amax(M,A(x,i)) 10 -bM d M
f d j Sa(M,A(x,s)) 0 dM
y(i,s,R) = R 6 (3.3)
Mmax 10bM df dx i dM
R 6
In equation (3.3), am,, and Sa are median attenuated values of peak ground acceleration
and of spectral acceleration at the period and damping of the viaduct structure. Also
notice that integration over M is limited to values from 6 to the maximum possible
magnitude from location x, as smaller magnitudes do not pose significant threat to the
Shinkansen system. Figure 3.2 presents the values of as functions of i and s for
earthquakes originating from different "sectors of origin". The estimated values of
y(i,s,R) for all coastal stations i and operational segments s for earthquakes originating
from all "sectors of origin" R are presented in Appendix I and more specifically in Tables
I-1 through I-8. Parameter b has the meaning of estimated spectral acceleration at track
location s above which emergency braking is considered appropriate. System B operates
on S waves. In evaluating the performance of system B, we make the simplifying
assumption that any automatic braking action is caused by the coastal accelerometer that
is closest to the epicenter.
System C
The idea behind system C is that more accurate warnings can be issued by estimating the
magnitude M and epicentral location x of the earthquake and then deciding about the
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action to take based on M and x. A system like this is the UrEDAS system; see Nakamura
(1988 and 1989). In the UrEDAS system, M and x are estimated from a single station
using P waves or S waves. The obvious advantage of using P waves is the increase in lead
time. Emergency braking may or may not be ordered depending on these first estimates
of M and x. The procedure is then repeated using S waves. The S-based estimates of M
and x have increased accuracy. The benefit of this system in added lead time is counter-
balanced to some degree by the limited estimation accuracy of M and x especially when
using P waves.
Following estimation of (M, x), the UrEDAS system evaluates the destructive potential at
all locations along the track. This is done using historical data on damage and non-
damage events, depending on magnitude and epicentral distance A(, s); see Figure 3.3.
The shaded area in that figure indicates (M, ) combinations that are considered
potentially damaging. For our analysis, only epicentral distances above about 80km are of
interest and the boundary between damage and non-damage conditions is linear in M and
logo 0.71M - log 0A = 3.20, as shown in Figure 3.3. Accordingly, we have considered
System C to trigger emergency braking if:
TRIG=(0.71M-logto[A(x,s)]-c )0 (3.4)
where c is a scaling parameter that controls the degree of conservatism in when using
System C.
The effectiveness of System C depends on the estimation accuracy of M and x. Figures
3.4a and 3.4b compare earthquake magnitudes estimated by the UrEDAS system using P
and S waves with actual magnitudes (JREast, personal communication). The plots show
that the S estimates are more accurate (all such estimates within + 0.5 of the actual
values) whereas for the P estimates the average is + 1.0. The latter value agrees with
Figure 3.4c, which includes larger earthquake magnitudes for which the reported
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accuracy is somewhat smaller (Nakamura, 1988). Based on these figures and indications
from JREast, we consider the following as reasonable values for the standard deviation of
the earthquake magnitude estimation error:
aMp = 1.0 (JMA) Magnitude estimation from P wave arrival
aM,s = 0.5 (JMA) Magnitude estimation from S wave arrival
Regarding the estimation accuracy of epicentral location, the information available is not
very conclusive. First, the azimuth and hypocentral distance are estimated from P and S
waves. Nakamura (1988) presents evidence that all estimates of the azimuth lie within a
range of + 20° of their actual values; see Figure 3.5a. This range is larger in Figure 3.5b
(JREast, personal communication). The estimation of hypocentral from P waves is not
very accurate (Nakamura, 1989), but accuracy increases (all estimates within + 20 km of
actual values) after the arrival of the S waves; see Figure 3.6a. Finally, Figure 3.6b
presents an illustration of the accuracy of the earthquake location estimation after the S
waves (Nakamura, 1989). This information, and personal communication with JREast,
lead us to estimate as follows the standard deviation of the estimation error for epicentral
distance of the earthquake:
ca p = 75% A Epicentral distance estimation from P wave arrival
as = 25 km Epicentral distance estimation from S wave arrival
where A is the epicentral distance in km. Due to the limited data available, these accuracy
values are highly uncertain. The sensitivity of seismic risk to such accuracy parameters
will be assessed in Chapter 6.
3.2 Alternative Wayside SEWS Systems
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Use of System to Reduce Seismic Risk
A wayside accelerometer may cause trains in the corresponding operational segment s to
stop if the intensity of ground motion exceeds a given threshold. At present, ground
motion intensity is measured in terms of peak ground acceleration ama. In this study, we
have considered as an alternative the use of spectral acceleration Sa at the period of the
viaduct (about 0.4sec) and for 5% of critical damping. The latter parameter is much better
related to structural damage than amax. The associated trigger levels are denoted by atloc
and SatloC. At present, atoc is set to 40gals.
Use of System to Determine Inspection Needs and to Resume Operation
After trains have been stopped by either the coastal or the wayside system, a decision
must be made regarding resumption of operation and possibly the need for track
inspection. Such decisions are based on the earthquake intensity at the wayside station
that is closest to the location of the stopped trains. Again, the intensity measure may be
amax or Sa.
The system currently operates with two threshold levels, Ainspi and Ainsp2 If amax<Ainspl,
the trains resume regular high-speed operation immediately after stopping, without
inspection of the tracks. We refer to these events as short delays. If Ainspl<amaxAinsp2,
the trains resume operation at a reduced speed (30-50 kmh) to perform on board
inspection of the tracks. We refer to these events as medium delays. Finally, if Ain'p2 is
lower or equal to amax, an on-foot inspection of the tracks is performed prior to
restoration of service (long delays). In the same manner, if the intensity parameter used is
Sa the associated track inspection levels are denoted by Sainspl and Sa,insp2
The current wayside system, operates in terms of a,,,, and the inspection levels are
Ajnspl= 8 0 gals and Ansp2= 120gals.
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Table 3.1: Stations of the coastal early warning system and track segments they control
(system A).
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No Location of From To Track Control
accelerometer location along track location along track section of
(km) segments
1 Hachinoche Shin-Kitakami Morioka Station 42.5 1 - 3
2 Miyako Shin-Kitakami Morioka Station 42.5 1 - 3
3 Ofunato Shin-Kozuruzawa Morioka Station 154.9 1 - 8
4 Kinkazan Shin-Shiraishi Shin-Kitakami 170.1 4 - 12
5 Soma Shin-Yabuki Shin-Kozuruzawa 151.5 9 - 16
6 Iwaki Shin-Ishibashi Shin-Nihonmastu 137.6 14- 20
7 Chosi Tokyo Station Shin-Ishibashi 95.4 20 - 26
8 Miura penins. Tokyo Station Shin-Nishinasuno 146.8 18 - 26
Figure 3.1: Map of "sectors of origin" of earthquakes, R.
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Figure 3.2: Expected value of ratio y(i, s, R)-between peak ground acceleration
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(b) "sector of origin" of earthquake, R=5.
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Chapter 4
Seismic Environment
In this Chapter, we consider models of earthquake recurrence in the offshore region that
may potentially affect the Tohoku Shinkansen line, as well as strong motion attenuation.
In each case, we briefly review the literature and then develop models for this study.
4.1 Seismicity
The literature on the seismicity of Japan is very extensive. Studies that cover the area of
interest include Takemura et al. (1989) for the area southwest of Tokyo, Kanda et al.
(1988) for the greater Tokyo region, Annaka et al. (1988) for the Kanto district, Utsu
(1974) for offshore northeastern Japan and Umino et al. (1993) for northeastern Japan in
general. Unfortunately, none of these studies covers completely the whole area of interest
to us. The model used in this study is based mainly on Utsu (1974) and is complemented
with information from Annaka et al. (1988).
Figure 4.1 shows the historical seismicity in the area of interest. As it is clear from this
figure, offshore seismicity, which is the focus of the present study, is far more intense
than inland seismicity. We have modeled offshore seismicity through fifteen seismogenic
regions ("sources"), within which earthquake activity is considered uniform. The sources
correspond for the most part to those of Utsu (1974), except for the fact that some of
Utsu's seismogenic regions have been split into several sources. The main reason for this
operation is computational expedience. Figure 4.2 shows the fifteen seismic regions of
the proposed model superimposed on historical seismicity. A statistical analysis of the
historical data produces estimates of the rate density X(M), where X(M)dM is the rate in
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events/year of earthquakes of magnitude between M and M+dM in a seismic source. We
assume that, X(M) has the following form:
X.(M)=lOa-b(M- 6 ) ; M < Mmax (4.1)
where a is a measure of the overall seismicity (10a is the rate density of earthquakes of
magnitude M around 6 )
b is a parameter that controls the relative frequency of events of different
magnitudes and
Mmax is the maximum earthquake magnitude that can possibly be generated by the
seismic source.
Table 4.1 gives for each of the fifteen seismic sources, estimates of the parameters (a, b,
Mma), the area, and the correspondence with the seismic sources of Utsu (1974).
Before discussing how the estimates of the seismicity parameters were obtained, we
observe that Utsu (1974) based his results on shallow earthquakes (focal depth 80km)
with magnitude M 6 during the period 1926 - 1973. On the other hand, the analysis of
Annaka et al. (1988) is based on shallow earthquakes (focal depth < 70 km) with
magnitude M > 6 during the period 1885 - 1986.
Seismic Sources 1.2. 4 5. 6. 8. 9: The rate density parameters a, b and Mmax were
directly derived from these of Utsu (1974), considering that the parameters a in that study
refer to 47 years of data.
Seismic Sources 10. 11. 12: These sources are parts of source L of Utsu. Their annual
rate density has been obtained by distributing the total rate proportionally to source areas.
Mmax is the same as for Utsu's source L.
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Seismic Source 3: This source corresponds to a part of Utsu's source H. Utsu gives no
clear information on the seismicity level of source H. Furthermore, this seismogenic
region is not studied in Annaka et al. (1988). Thus, the rate density per km2 of the
neighboring source E (Utsu, 1974) for M=6 is assigned to source H and adjusting for the
area of source 3. Because no large earthquake has occurred in source H during the period
1926 - 1973, we assumed Mmax = 8.0, which is a value somewhat smaller than that of
source E.
Seismic Source 7: We assign to this source a rate density per km2 equal to that of the
neighboring sources K and L, as no clear information on the a parameter given by Utsu
on the corresponding source J. We take Mmax= 8.5, mainly because of a series of large
earthquakes in 1938.
Seismic Source 13: According to Utsu, source M is tectonically similar to source L.
Therefore the b-value for the corresponding region 13 was assumed equal to the value for
source L. Also the rate density and the maximum magnitude for source 13 have been
taken from Utsu's source L.
Seismic Source 14: No clear information is provided in Utsu (1974) for this region. We
have based our estimate on information from the geographically close zones 16 and 20 in
Annaka et al. (1988), adjusting for the area of region 14. The value of Mmax is also taken
from the latter publication.
Seismic Source 15: As for region 14, we estimate the values of the seismicity parameters
from information on zone 27 in Annaka et al. (1988), adjusting for areas.
Clearly, the parameters in Table 4.1 are just point estimates. Sensitivity of the risk to the
values of b and Mma,, will be presented in Chapter 6.
4.2 Strong Motion Attenuation
Several studies of strong motion attenuation have been made using data from the region
of interest and from other seismically active areas of the world. For our analysis, we are
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interested in the attenuation of peak ground acceleration amx and response spectrum
acceleration Sa with 5% damping of critical. For amax pertinent studies include Yamabe et
al. (1988), Tomatsu et al. (1988), Kobayashi et al. (1988) and Kawashima et al. (1984)
based on earthquakes in Japan, Boore et al. (1993) based on western North American
earthquakes and Fukushima et al. (1988) based on worldwide earthquakes. Selected
recent studies on Sa attenuation are those of Annaka et al.(1988), Kawashima et al. (1984)
based on earthquakes in Japan and Boore et al. (1993) based on western North American
earthquakes.
Most of these studies refer to specific subsoil conditions (usually "firm ground" or
"rock"). Only the last two studies take into account the amplification effect from different
local soil conditions. As local amplification may have a significant effect on damage, we
have included the influence of soil conditions in our analysis although in a simplified
categorical manner. Kawashima et al. (1984), has derived different attenuation relations
for different soil types. The latter are defined as in Table 4.2, based on geological
characteristics of the site and on the natural period of the soil layer above bedrock, TG.
This period is:
4H
TG= V (4.2)
Vs
where H is the thickness of the soil layer above bedrock,
Vs is a representative value of the shear wave velocity of the soil layer.
The soil classification presented in Table 4.2 is assumed to correspond to that included in
the standard design code of the Japanese National Railways (Table 2.4), that was used in
the design of the Tohoku viaduct structure. This assumption is reasonable for the
following reasons : (a) soil types I, II in Tables 2.4 and 4.2 have similar geologic
descriptions and (b) the very low SPT values for soil type III in Table 2.4 correspond, in
general, to soft alluvium and reclaimed land, that is soil type III in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.3a compares median attenuated values of amax, for earthquake magnitude M = 5
and rock conditions, according to various studies. It appears from this and other
comparisons that the Kawashima et al. (1984) attenuation yields too high values of amax at
such low magnitudes, while the median values from Boore et al. (1993) are consistent
with those from other Japanese studies. Figure 4.3b makes a similar comparison for
earthquake magnitude M = 8 and rock conditions. In this case, the attenuated median
value of ama according to Kawashima et al. (1984) is a reasonable upper bound value,
while the value from Boore et al. (1993) appears unrealistically low for eastern Japan.
Based on comparisons of this type, we have specified attenuation relations for the area of
interest of the general type:
Y=a lObM(A+3 0 )-c (43)
where Y is the median attenuated value of the seismic intensity parameter of interest
(either peak ground acceleration amax or spectral acceleration Sa with 5%
damping in a random horizontal direction).,
A is epicentral distance in km and
(a, b, c) are parameters that depend on the soil conditions for amax and on
both soil conditions and the natural period T for Sa.
This relation is based on the attenuation of Kawashima et al. (1984), but the values of the
attenuation parameters are calibrated to account for what we believe is an overprediction
of Y at low magnitudes, as suggested by Figure 4.3. The calibration was performed for
different soil conditions and natural periods so as to produce values of Y similar to those
of Boore et al. (1993) at low magnitudes. More specifically, parameters a and b of
equation (4.3) were adjusted from the original values of Kawashima et al. (1984) to yield:
- The value of Y according to Boore et al. (1993) for M = 5 and A = 100 km.
- The value of Y according to Kawashima et al. (1984) for M = 8 and A = 100km.
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This modification resulted generally in smaller values of a and larger values of b. The
resulting law is referred to here as the "modified Kawashima" attenuation model. The
parameters of the original and modified Kawashima et al. (1984) attenuation relations for
ama and Sa (the latter, for periods T = 0.3 and 0.5 sec that are of greatest interest for this
study) are given in Table 4.3.
The values of amx and Sa given earthquake magnitude M and epicentral distance A are
typically found to follow a log-normal distribution. The dispersion of the distribution is
usually given in terms of the logarithmic standard deviation ainy, estimates of which from
Kawashima et al. (1984) are given in Table 4.4. These estimates have been retained also
in the "modified Kawashima" attenuation model.
In the study of seismic risk of the Tohoku Shinkansen, it is necessary to specify an
attenuation model of Sa for natural periods between T = 0.3 sec and T = 0.5 sec. As such
intermediate periods are not considered in the original study of Kawashima et al. (1984),
we have used a log-linear interpolation scheme of the attenuated parameter between
periods 0.3 and 0.5 sec.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 compare median attenuated values of amax, and Sa per soil type,
according to Boore et al. (1993), Kawashima et al. (1984) and the modified Kawashima
model. Comparison of Sa is for T = 0.4 sec, which is a period of particular importance in
the seismic risk study of the Shinkansen viaduct.
The very large accelerations and velocities recorded during the January 17, 1995 Hyogo-
ken-Nambu Earthquake (the "Kobe earthquake") of January 17, 1995 has raised questions
regarding the accuracy of the attenuation model proposed in this study. Figure 4.6
compares recorded values of am,, and estimated values of Sa with 5% damping during this
earthquake of JMA magnitude 7.2 (Mw=6.8) at different epicentral distances (JREast,
personal communication), to the median attenuated values according to the modified
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Kawashima model. This comparison shows that the model underestimates the recorded
accelerations at small epicentral distances, whereas better agreement is found at larger
distances. This discrepancy is attributed for the most part to the combined effect of the
near-field radiation pattern and the amplification from local soil conditions. The latter
was especially large in the reclaimed land of the Kobe port and Awaji island (NCEER
Bulletin, 1995). A sensitivity analysis relative to the attenuation parameters will be
reported later in this study.
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Table 4.1: Gutenberg - Richter parameters for the annual earthquake rate density of the
fifteen seismic regions in Figure 4.2 and their correspondence to the seismic
sources of Utsu (1974).
Table 4.2: Soil classification used by Kawashima et al. (1984)
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Seismic Region a b Mmax AREA
( Sources: Utsu, 1974) (104 kinm2)
1 (D) - 0.05 0.87 7.5 2.25
2 (E) 0.16 0.82 8.5 1.86
3 (H) - 0.29 0.82 8.0 0.58
4 (F) 0.60 1.15 8.0 2.64
5 (G)- 0.18 1.01 7.5 1.47
6 (I) 0.10 0.90 8.0 1.00
7 (J)- 0.74 1.06 8.5 0.23
8 (J) 0.07 1.06 8.5 1.69
9 (K) - 0.07 1.06 7.5 0.95
10 (L) - 0.59 1.06 7.5 0.28
11 (L) - 1.14 1.06 7.5 0.09
12 (L) - 0.28 1.06 7.5 0.32
13 (M) - 0.33 1.06 7.5 0.33
14 (N) - 0.27 1.00 8.0 2.82
15 (O) - 0.33 1.00 8.0 2.03
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ii __ iiii__iiii
Soil Type Geological Description Definition by
Natural Period, TG
I Tertiary rock - Diluvium with H < 10 m TG < 0.2 sec
H Diluvium (H > lOm) - Alluvium (H <25m) 0.2 < TG < 0.6 sec
II Soft Alluvium - Reclaimed Land TG > 0.6 sec
rlii i iiii ii
Soil Type I III
(Table 4.2 )
Attenuation Original Modified Original Modified Original Modified
Model Kawashima Kawashima Kawashima Kawashima Kawashima Kawashima
et al.(1984) et al.(1984) et al.(1984) et al.(1984) et al.(1984) et al.(1984)
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
a (am) 987.4 90.0 232.5 138.1 403.8 412.5
b (a.) 0.216 0.346 0.313 0.341 0.265 0.264
c (amax) 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.218
a (Sa;T=0.3s) 574.8 22.1 266.8 37.9 1263 240.2
b(Sa;T=0.3s) 0.273 0.450 0.345 0.451 0.224 0.314
c (Sa;T=0.3s) 1.178 1.178 1.178 1.178 1.178 1.178
a(Sa;T=0.5s) 211.8 12.2 102.2 14.8 580.6 58.1
b(Sa;T=0.5s) 0.299 0.454 0.388 0.493 0.281 0.406
c (Sa;T=0.5s) 1.178 1.178 1.178 1.178 1.178 1.178
Table 4.3: Parameters of the original and modified Kawashima et al.(1984) attenuation
relations for aa and Sa (the latter, for T = 0.3 and 0.5 sec and 5% of critical
damping).
Soil Type (Table 4.2) 1 H m
ny (amax) 0.497 0.516 0.454
Cyny (Sa; T = 0.3sec) 0.555 0.622 0.500
alny (Sa; T = 0.Ssec) 0.640 0.573 0.553
Table 4.4: Logarithmic standard deviations of a,, and Sa, given earthquake magnitude
M and epicentral distance A (Kawashima et al., 1984).
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Figure 4.1: Historical seismicity in area of interest for the period 1885-1983
60
Figure 4.2: Sources of the proposed earthquake recurrence model for offshore
seismicity superimposed on the historical seismicity (1885-1983).
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Figure 4.3: Peak ground acceleration at rock sites according to various studies:
(a) M = 5 and (b) M=8.
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(a) soil type I, (b) soil type II and (c) soil type III.
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Figure 4.6: (a) Recorded peak ground accelerations during the Kobe earthquake
and median values according to the "modified Kawashima" model
for soil types I, II, III and M=7.2.
(b) Estimated spectral accelerations at T=0.4sec and 5% damping of
critical compared to median values according to the "modified
Kawashima" model for soil types I, II, III and M=7.2.
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Chapter 5
Risk Analysis
In this chapter, we describe the method used to assess the rate of earthquake-induced
derailments and trains delays, as functions of the type of seismic early warning system
(System A, B or C) and of the operational parameters (choice of intensity parameter and
trigger and inspection levels). A seismic fragility model for the viaduct structure is
described first, followed by a discussion of the performance measures of the effectiveness
of the seismic early warning system and by the general procedure for their evaluation.
The last three sections of this Chapter address the specific problem of calculating the
conditional probabilities of SEWS trigger, train derailment and train delay.
5.1 Seismic Fragility of the Viaduct Structure
A key component of the seismic risk analysis is the evaluation of the probability of
viaduct damage in an operational segment s, given earthquake magnitude M and
epicentral location x. This probability is used in the calculation of the risk of earthquake-
induced derailments. First, we consider the probability of damage "at a point" (for a
single viaduct span) and then proceed to the estimation of damage anywhere along a line
segment, including the effect of damage clustering.
Probability of Damage of a Single Viaduct Span, Pl(Sa)
There is ample evidence from the literature that, for structures like the Shinkansen
viaduct, a good measure of the destructiveness of earthquake motion is spectral
acceleration at an appropriate period and for an appropriate damping ratio. We denote by
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Pi(Sa) the probability that a single viaduct span is damaged, given that it experiences a
spectral acceleration Sa. In calculating P(Sa), we assume that structural resistance in
terms of Sa follows a log-normal distribution (NIBS Technical Manual, 1994). This
resistance distribution has a median value Rm which depends on structural and
geotechnical parameters. In evaluating Rm, we proceed as follows:
(1) Assess the viaduct top relative displacement at yielding, by: According to JREast, for
a viaduct height of Om (this is the average as well as the most common height), designed
under normal soil conditions, this displacement is 8y = 3.1 - 3.4cm.
(2) Evaluate the median spectral acceleration at yielding S: For three values of the
natural period T of the structure and using the relationship: Sa = 2 Sdy these median
values are:
T = 0.3sec: S = 1.36g- 1.49g
T = 0.4sec: S,y = 0.76g - 0.84g
T= 0.5sec: S,y = 0.49g - 0.54g
(3) Take into account the effect of structural ductility A, to obtain the median spectral
acceleration S that causes the ductility capacity of the viaduct to be exceeded. We
assume that derailment due to track damage does not occur unless the viaduct structure
has accumulated permanent deformation in excess of its ductility capacity. Denoting by
R(~)= Su/Sy the factor by which the median resistance relative to first yielding is
increased to produce ultimate ductility conditions, we evaluate R(p) as:
R(g)=(cg-c+l) 1Ix (5.1)
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(.1)7
x=1.78+ 0T5 (5.2)
T
c=1.80- 0.0422 (5.3)
T
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The above expressions are taken from a study of elasto-plastic 1-DOF systems by
Osteraas et al. (1990). The function R(p) in equation (5.1) was also used by Takada et
al.(1988 and 1989). Values of x, c, and R(p.) for p. ranging from 1 to 4, and for T=0.3, 0.4
and 0.5sec are listed in Table 5.1.
(4) Consider the effect of local soil conditions: All previous values of Sa y refer to normal
soil conditions. Soil conditions were considered in the design of the Tohoku Shinkansen
by scaling the design strength of the structure by a coefficient that depends on soil type;
see Table 2.4. One can thus calculate the median resistance Rm of the structure depending
on soil conditions, ductility level and natural period. According to JREast, the expected
ductility of the structure is p.=4. This level of ductility means that the structure must
undergo considerable deformation and softening before failing, which leads us to increase
the effective natural period from T = 0.30 - 0.36 sec for the structure in the elastic range
to T = 0.4 - 0.5 sec for a heavily damaged structure. For T=0.4sec, which is the equivalent
period we have used in base-case calculations, and for p. = 4, Rn has the following values:
Rock: R. = 1.48g
Normal soil: R = 1.85g
Soft soil: R. = 2.22g
The above refers to the median resistance of the structure in terms of spectral acceleration
at the effective period T. In order to define the log-normal distribution of R, one needs in
addition the logarithmic standard deviation CrInR. Based on results from an extensive
statistical analysis for railway bridges in the Continental US (NIBS Technical Manual,
1994) and on literature on the seismic fragility of framed reinforced concrete structures,
we have set that InR = 0.40.
It should be noted that the train could derail also without track damage, due to excessive
vibratory motion. This cause of derailment might in fact become dominant over portions
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of the viaduct founded on soft soil, because of the higher structural resistance under such
conditions. Our estimates of the probability of local structural damage and JREast
estimates of the probability of derailment due to vibratory motion for Sa = 1.0, 1.5, 2.0g
are as follows:
For the epicentral distances of 80 km or larger in which we are interested in this study,
the values of Sa that are responsible for most of the derailment events are below 1.0g and
for these levels of vibration, the risk of derailment due to shaking is negligible relative to
that from structural damage. Therefore, we have decided to exclude vibratory motion as a
cause of derailment.
Spatial Dependence of Damage
The viaduct structure of the Tohoku Shinkansen is composed of a series of short spans
(with length SP=7m). In order to include clustering of the damaged/non-damaged spans
(as for example was observed in the recent Kobe earthquake) one may model the
alternation of undamaged-damaged spans as a Markov 0-1 model. According to the
model, the number of continuously damaged or continuously undamaged spans has a
geometric (essentially exponential) distribution. The parameters of the model are:
no(Sa) = mean number of continuously undamaged spans, given that the local
level of spectral acceleration is Sa
nl(Sa) = mean number of continuously damaged spans, given that the local level
of spectral acceleration is Sa.
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Conditional Probabilities (given Sa) Sa = L.Og Sa = 1.Sg Sa = 2.0g
Probability of local structural damage 0.095 0.261 0.436
Probability of derailment due to vibratory 0.010 0.100 0.250
motion
An equivalent parameterization of the Markov model is in terms of the marginal
probability of damage of the generic single span, Pi(Sa), and the conditional probability
P1ii(Sa), which is the probability that a span is damaged given that the previous span is
damaged and given the level Sa of ground motion. Hence, the latter is defined as,
PlllI(Sa) = P[span i+l is damaged, given that span i is damaged and Sa occurred]
The relation between the two parameterizations is as follows:
ni(Sa)= 1 (5.4)
1-PI(Sa)
no(Sa)=n(Sa) IPi(Sa) (5.5)
PqtSa)
Also, it is convenient to simplify the model by setting:
Plii(Sa)=l+cl logio[Pl(Sa)] ; 0 < cl < 0.1 (forPl(Sa)>10') (5.6)
Equation (5.6) formulates the physical phenomenon of clustering of earthquake damage.
This is why the value of the conditional probability is much higher than the value of the
corresponding marginal probability. Moreover, both marginal and conditional
probabilities increase with an increase of the level of the local spectral acceleration. The
value of parameter cl in equation (5.6) governs the extent of the conditionally damaged
track, given a specific value of P. We have found that reasonable estimate of cl is
cl=0.03. This choice of cl corresponds to the values of n and n in Table 5.2. Such
values of nl and no are consistent with the damage caused by the Kobe earthquake to local
Shinkansen viaduct: North of the exit of the tunnel through the Rokko Mountain, the
viaduct suffered damage over four major sections within a length of approximately 3 km
(NCEER Bulletin, 1995). Within this clustered damage region, there were approximately
30 - 35 collapsed spans. From Figure 4.6 one may estimate that the local Sa value may
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have been around lg. For normal soil conditions, this corresponds to PI of about 0.12 and
an expected number of continuously damaged spans of about 36.
Probability of Derailment
Suppose, for the moment, that the spectral acceleration Sa at the track reaches its
maximum value instantly. Assume that a train of length L travels a distance LE after the
arrival of the S waves. We define the probability of derailment Pd as the probability that
the train meets damaged track (see previous section for the less significant contribution
from vibratory motion). Under these simplifying assumptions, the event of no-derailment
occurs only if (a) the last point of the train, coming from undamaged conditions (before
the strong motion arrives at the track), encounters no damage in track length LE and stops
instantly, and if (b) the instant before stopping, the section of track of length L occupied
by the train is entirely undamaged given that it is undamaged at the location where the
train terminates; see Figure 5.1 for illustration of event of no-derailment. From the fact
that the distribution of undamaged and damaged sections is exponential and using
equation (5.5) we define the probabilities of the aforementioned events a, b as:
Pa(Sa) = e[LE/(SP) ] /n o(Sa) (5.7)
Pb(Sa) = e-[L/(SP)] /n o(Sa) (5.8)
where SP=7m, is the length of a single viaduct span. Based on equations (5.7) and (5.8)
and assuming independence of events a and b, the probability of no-derailment given Sa is
given by:
Pno d(Sa) = Pa(Sa) Pb(Sa) = e[(LE + L)/(SP)] /no(Sa) (5.9)
Based on equation (5.9) and given that the events of derailment and no-derailment are
complementary, we define the probability of derailment given Sa as follows:
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Pd(Sa) = 1- Pd(Sa) = 1- e[(LE + L)/(SP)]/no(Sa)
According to equation (5.10), the probability of derailment, Pd(M, x, s) of a train running
in operational segment s, given the occurrence of an earthquake of magnitude M at
epicentral location x, is given by:
Pd(M,x,s) = 1- Esal M,x,s[e -[(LE+L) / (SP)]/no(Sa)] (5.11)
Because tunnels protect trains from derailing (e.g. see the good performance of the Rokko
Mountain tunnel during the Kobe earthquake), we incorporate this in the analysis by a
risk reduction factor, trf(s) of the probability of derailment reflecting the assumption that
tunnels are considered safe havens for running trains in segment s. When the S waves
arrive at operational segment s, we assume that trains can be anywhere along that
segment with equal probability. Thus, the actual location of trains and tunnels within an
operational segment is not important in this analysis. In this perspective, risk reduction
due to the fact that a train may be in a tunnel when the S waves arrive at the track is
analogous to the fraction of the segment length in tunnels. Hence, this parameter is
considered through trf(s) which is defined as follows:
trf(s)=-1 tun(s) (5.12)
seg(s)
where tun(s) is the total tunnel length in segment s and seg(s) is the length of segment s
(see Table 2.5). According to equations (5.11) and (5.12), the probability of derailment
Pd(M, x, s) is as in equation (5.13):
tu(s)) (5.13)Pd(M,x,s) = (1- ESaIM, x,s[e'[(LE+L)/(SP)]/no(Sa)])( - (5.13)
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(5.10)
Equation (5.13) provides the general fragility model used in this study. However, the
early warning system may cause the train to start braking before the intense phase of
ground motion arrives at the track. One might envision cases when, at the time of arrival
of the strong motion, the train has completely stopped or is decelerating, cases when
braking takes place after the strong motion has reached its peak at the track, and cases
when no braking takes place because the early warning system did not trigger. Moreover,
the site intensity Sa is varying and the train speed is not constant. How these various
conditions affect the conditional probability of derailment in a general form in equation
(5.13), will be shown in Section 5.4.
5.2 General Procedure of SEWS Performance Evaluation
In order to avoid derailments, the present early warning system tends to stop trains at a
high rate. In a few cases such actions may turn out to be justified (they indeed result in
derailment avoidance), but in most cases they produce "false alarms" and unnecessary
delays of various durations. Hence, a reasonable way to characterize the performance of
the early warning system is to calculate the rate of derailments that were not prevented
and the rate of delays of various magnitudes. More specifically, we define four rates:
* DE = annual rate of earthquake-induced derailments. This is the expected number of
trains per year that derail due to earthquakes, anywhere along the line.
* XSD = annual rate of earthquake-induced short delays. This is the expected number of
trains per year that, after being stopped by the SEWS system, are immediately allowed to
resume operation without any inspection of the tracks.
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* kMD = annual rate of earthquake-induced medium delays. This is the expected number
of trains per year that, after being stopped by the SEWS system, resume operation at low
speed (30 - 50 kmh) to perform on board inspection of the tracks.
* LD = annual rate of earthquake-induced long delays. This is the expected number of
trains per year that, after being stopped by the SEWS system, are not allowed to resume
operation until on-foot inspection of the tracks has been completed.
Whether a stopped train experiences a short, medium or long delay depends on the
intensity of ground motion recorded along the track and on the threshold levels AinspI and
Ainsp2 for track inspection; see Chapter 3. Trains that experience short delays face the
possibility of derailing after resuming operation since no track inspection is performed in
that case. This is not true for trains experiencing medium and long delays, as the track
inspection procedure is assumed to identify any track damage and eliminate any
possibility of derailment. The added derailment risk following short delays is taken into
account in the present analysis and has led to two definitions of XDE, one before and the
other after the resumption of service following short delays.
Considerable simplification in the evaluation of the delay rates follows from considering
each train in isolation, thus neglecting train interaction in the form of propagation of
delays, train cancellations, e.t.c. In this and the following chapters we use this simplifying
assumption. The effect of interactions can be estimated through corrective factors, as
discussed in Appendix II.
Mathematical Formulation
The general procedure to calculate the rates DE, XSD, XMD, LD for a given early warning
system is as follows: Let E be the event of interest (E can be DE, SD, MD, or LD, where
the symbols stand for derailment, short delay, medium delay and long delay events).
Then the annual rate XE is given by:
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XEISEWS = f (X(M,x)E[NsP[EIM,x,s,SEWS]) dxdM (5.14)
Mx s
where (M, x) is the rate density per year of earthquakes of magnitude M at epicentral
location x. This rate density is given by
10 a-b(M-6)
.(M,x)= I 'abM6 , M < Mmax (5.15)AREA
where a and b are the Gutenberg-Richter parameters for the seismic source
to which x belongs (see Chapter 4) and AREA is the area of that seismic
source.
E[Ns] is the expected number of trains running at a random point in time in
operational segment s. Values of E[N] for the 26 operational segments of
the Tohoku Shinkansen line are given in Section 2.1.
P[EIM, x, s, SEWS] is the probability of event E occurring under the given early
warning system for a train running in operational segment s, an earthquake
of magnitude M and epicentral location x. This probability may in turn be
written as:
P[EIM,x,s,SEWS]=XT P[TIM,x,s,SEWS] P[EIM,x,s,T] (5.16)
where T is the generic trigger/no-trigger status of the early warning system . T has the
following logical values: T=Tc for automatic braking triggered by the coastal system,
T=T10oc for automatic braking triggered by the local (wayside) system, and T="No T" in
the case of no triggering. In the remainder of this chapter, we show how the probabilities
in the right hand side of equation (5.16) are evaluated for different E, T and SEWS
systems.
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5.3 Conditional Probability of Trigger, PITIM. x. s. SEWS]
Here we consider how one can evaluate the probability of various triggering events T, for
a train running in segment s, when an earthquake of magnitude M occurs at epicentral
location x. Automatic braking may be caused by first triggering the coastal or the wayside
system. We denote such events by Tc and T1oc, respectively. "No T" means that neither Tc
nor Tloc occurs, hence that automatic braking is not activated.
For P[TCIM, x, s, SEWS] we must differentiate among the different coastal systems, for
which we use the symbols A (current system), B (modification of current system) and C
(UrEDAS system); see Chapter 3 for details on such systems. Systems A and B trigger on
horizontal acceleration a, whereas for the wayside system we consider either horizontal
(perpendicular to track) acceleration a or response spectrum acceleration Sa at the natural
period of the viaduct. Due to the location of the earthquake sources relative to the coastal
and wayside accelerometers, it is safe to assume that, if both the coastal and the wayside
systems trigger, then the coastal system is the one that triggers first (To occurs). A second
simplifying assumption is that, if systems B and C cause trains in segment s to stop, then
the event occurs due to triggering of the coastal station that is closest to the epicenter.
Under these conditions, P[TCIM, x, s, SEWS] for coastal systems A and B is obtained as
follows:
For System A operating with trigger horizontal acceleration a*,
P[TclM,x,s,A]=P[amax(M,A(x,i))>a ] (5.17)
where A(x, i) is the distance between x and the coastal accelerometer i that controls
operational segment s and amx(M, A(, i)) is the attenuated peak ground acceleration at
the i-th coastal station. The correspondence between coastal detectors and operational
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track segments was shown earlier in Chapter 2. At present, JREast is operating the coastal
system using policy A with a*=40gals.
For System B operating with trigger horizontal accelerations at(i, s, R),
P[TclM,x,s,B]=P[amax(M,A(x,i))>at(i,s,(xeRi))] (5.18)
where i is now the coastal station that is closest to the epicenter and Ri is the
corresponding sector of origin. The trigger accelerations at for system B are calculated
from equations (3.2) and (3.3) and therefore depend on a single operational parameter b*,
which corresponds to a given predicted value of Sa along the track.
System C may trigger upon the arrival of either P or S waves. For given estimates of M
and A, the system causes trains to stop if the parameter TRIG defined in equation (3.4) is
positive. Considering uncertainty on the estimates of (M, x), given the corresponding true
values, TRIG may be modelled as a random variable with normal distribution, mean
value given by equation (3.4) and variance
anmG2=(0.71cM)2 +( aA)2 (5.19)
A ln1O
The formulation of the variance of parameter TRIG in equation (5.19) is consistent with
the definition of that parameter in equation (3.4). Denoting by TRIGps the values of
TRIG obtained using the estimates of (M, ) from P and S waves and assuming that
(TRIGp M, x) and (TRIGs M, x) are independent, the conditional probability of trigger
under system C is found as:
P[TIM,x,s,C]=P[TRIGP>O]+(l-P[TRIGP>0]) P[TRIGs>0] (5.20)
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Note that the mean values of (TRIGp IM, ) and (TRIGS IM, x) depend on a single
operational parameter c.
The probability of triggering by the wayside system is given by the following equations:
P[TIoclM,x,s,SEWS]=P[amax(M,A(x,s))>at.ioc](1-P[TclM,x,s,SEWS]) (5.21)
P[TioclM,x,s,SEWS]=P[Sa(M,A(x,s))Sat,loc](l-P[TcIM,x,s,SEWS]) (5.22)
respectively for the cases when the system operates with peak ground acceleration amax or
spectral acceleration Sa. Here, A(x, s) is the distance between the epicentral location xi and
the operational segment s, and at,,c and Sat,loc are the preset trigger levels of the wayside
system.
Under the assumption of independence, the probability of no-trigger by either the coastal
or the wayside system is as given by the following equation:
P[noTIM,x,s, SEWS] = (1- P[TclM,x,s,SEWS])( - P[TiocIM, x, s, SEWS]) (5.23)
5.4 Conditional Probability of Derailment. P[DEIM, x. s, T]
Next we consider the probabilities of derailment given (M, x) and given different
trigger/no trigger events, i.e. for T=T, Tc or "no T". These specific expressions are all
based on equation (5.12), which gives the probability of derailment in general.
If emergency braking of the train is caused by the coastal system. then the probability of
derailment is given by the following equation (5.24):
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P[DEIM,x,s,Tc] =
= (1- ESalM,x,s[(e-[(L/(SP)]/no(Sastop)])(e-[D/(SP)]/no (Sa))]) (1 tun(s)
seg(s)
where D is the distance traveled from the time of strong motion arrival at the train
location until complete stop.
Sastop is the maximum horizontal spectral acceleration normal to the track, prior to
complete stopping of the train. Because we are conditioning on coastal
triggering (To), there is some lead time of train braking before strong
motion arrives at the track. This is why potentially, Sastop could be smaller
than Sa.
no'(S) is a single representative value of the mean number of undamaged viaduct
spans, no, from the time when the strong motion arrives at the train
location until complete train stopping. This representative value is
calculated as:
no'(Sa)= V(t) (5.25)
f dt
f no(Sa(t))
where V(t) is the train speed at time t since emergency braking started.
The function V(t) has been obtained from the braking curve in Figure 5.2,
which has the following analytical expression:
V(t)[km/sec]= Vmax[kmh]-2.85t[sec] (5.26)
3600 (5.26)
where Vm, is the speed of the train when braking starts.
The formulation of no'(Sa) in equation (5.25) considers the concurrent time-
variability of the speed of the train and of the level of Sa. Through time-
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integration, the denominator takes into account the distance traveled by the train
from the time of strong motion arrival at the train location until complete stop
(distance D). In order for no'(Sa) to represent continuous undamaged viaduct
spans, we formulate equation (5.25) with distance D in the numerator.
If emergency braking of the train is caused by the wayside system. then the probability of
derailment, based again on equation (5.13), is given by the following equation:
P[DEIM,x,s,Tloc)=(-ESalM,x,s[e - [(L+Dtot)/(SP)]/no
where Dtot is the track length traveled by the train
stoppage. Dtot is obtained by an integration of
approximately:
(Sa) ])(1_ tun(s)
seg(s) (5.27)
from full speed until complete
equation (5.26), which gives
Dtot [km] = 0.1754 Vmax[kmh]2
3600 (5.28)
Equation (5.27) sets simply length LE of equation (5.13) equal to Dtot. This is because in
this case braking begins after the maximum level of Sa has been reached and therefore the
total distance traveled is equal to Dtot. The track section of length Dtot is potentially
damaged from the maximum level of local intensity Sa, since emergency braking starts
after this level has been reached.
If no braking of the train occurs. then based on equation (5.13) the conditional probability
of derailment is given by the following equation:
P[DEIMsxssnoT)=(-ESaIMxs[C[ {L+SEC(s)})/(SP)]/no(Sa) ])(l tun(s)
seg(s) (5.29)
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where SEC(s) is the length of track that a train in operational segment s covers, if it is
not ordered to stop from either detection system. SEC(s) is evaluated as
half the distance between trains travelling in s in the same direction, and is
a function of the expected number of trains in that segment. Notice that,
after the train has travelled a distance SEC(s), the track ahead has already
been covered by other trains and, if such trains have not derailed, is safe.
Equation (5.29) sets simply length LE of equation (5.13) equal to SEC(s).This is because
we assume that, according to the aforementioned reasoning, that the train travels this
distance under risk of derailment after the maximum level of seismic intensity Sa has
been reached.
5.4.1 Conditional Probability of Derailment following Resumption of Service
following a Short Delay, P[DEIM, x, s, SD]
After a train has been stopped, if the first track inspection level Ainspi has not been
exceeded, the train is allowed to resume immediately normal operation. Because, with a
small probability, the track ahead may have been damaged (especially if the first
inspection level is set high), it is necessary to evaluate the probability of derailment
following a short delay event. For the cases when the wayside system operates with peak
ground acceleration or peak spectral acceleration, this probability of derailment is given
by the following equations (5.30a) and (5.30b):
P[DEIM,x,s,SD]=(1-ESaIM,x,s[e-[(L+SEC(s)-Dtot}/(SP)]/no(Sa)]) (1- tun(s)
seg(s)
P[DEIM,x,s,SD]=(1- [e-[{L+SEC(s)Dtot}l/(SP)]/no(Sa)]) (1 tim(s)
Sa•Sa,inspI
where we have assumed that the length of potentially damaged tracks travelled after
resumption of service is (SEC(s)-Dto), i.e. is the potentially damaged length travelled if
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the train was not ordered to brake (see equation 5.29) minus the distance already covered
during braking (see equation 5.27).
Equation (5.30a) is obtained under the assumption that, Sa and amax, are conditionally
independent, given M, x, s. More specifically, the fact that it was a short delay, i.e. amax
was below the first track inspection level, does not yield any information regarding the
value of Sa; therefore we take the expected value of the exponential term as the best
estimate. This is not the case for equation (5.30b) where we consider only the values of Sa
below the first inspection level. The assumption of conditional independence of Sa and
a,, leads probably to a slight overestimation of the derailment probability in equation
(5.30a) but there is no conclusive evidence of their correlation.
5.5 Conditional Probability of Various Delays, P[EIM. x, s, T; E=SD. MD. LD
Delays can be caused by either the coastal or the wayside system; these events are
denoted by T and To, as indicated earlier in Section 5.3. The wayside system can
operate on either ama, or Sa, but here we give formulas just for the former, for reasons of
brevity. For an Sa-based operation of the wayside system, the equations are completely
analogous.
Short Delays
P[SDIM,x,s,Tc] = P[amax(M, A(x, s)) < Ainspi] (5.31)
P[SDI M,x,s,Tloc] = P[at, ioc < amax(M, A(x,s)) < Ainspl] (5.32)
P[SDIM, x,s, noT]= 0 (5.33)
Medium Delays
P[MDIM,x,s,Tc] = P[Ainspl < amax(M, A(x,s)) < Ainsp2] (5.34)
P[MDIM,x,s, Tic] = P[Ainspl < amax(M,A(x,s)) < Ainsp2] (5.35)
P[MDIM,x,s,noT]= 0 (5.36)
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Long Delays
P[LDIM,x,s,Tc] = P[Ainsp2 < amax(M,A(x,s))] (5.37)
P[LDIM,x,s, Tioc] P[Ainsp2 < amax(M, A(x,s))] (5.38)
P[LDIM,x,s, noT] 0 (5.39)
5.6 Conditional Total Probability of Derailment
Equations (5.14) and (5.16) provide the means to calculate the annual rate of derailments
for any given seismic early warning system, DEISEWS. This is the annual rate of
derailments excluding derailments during resumption of operation following short delays.
Similar expressions give the total annual rate of derailments, including this additional risk
of derailment. This is introduced by the following equation (5.40):
Pi[DEI M, x, s, SEWS] = Pe[DEI M, x, s, SEWS] + P[DEI M, x, s, SD]P[SDI M, x, s, SEWS]
where Pi[DEIM,x,s,SEWS] is the conditional probability of derailment including
resumption of operation following short delays, and
Pc[DEIM, x, s, SEWS] is the conditional probability of derailment before
resumption of operation, as calculated from equations (5.16) through
(5.24), and (5.27), (5.29).
83
Parameter T = 0.3 sec T = 0.4 sec T = 0.5 sec
x 2.303 2.173 2.094
c 1.659 1.695 1.716
R(p), g = 1 1.000 1.000 1.000
R(ji), t = 2 1.529 1.578 1.611
~R(I, = 3 1.887 1.975 2.036
R(gt), ; = 4 2.174 2.296 2.381
Table 5.1: Values of x, c and the ductility modification factor R(pt) for T = 0.3, 0.4,
0.5secand = 1,2,3,4.
Pt Pll no l1
0.00001 0.85 666660 6.67
0.00010 0.88 83325 8.33
0.00100 0.91 11100 11.11
0.01000 0.94 1650 16.67
0.10000 0.97 300 33.33
i * *** *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Table 5.2: Expected number of continuously damaged (nl) and undamaged (no) viaduct s
pans for given values of the probability of damage of a single viaduct span Pl and
cl=0.03.
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of a no-derailment event.
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Figure 5.2: Shinkansen braking curve (JREast personal communication).
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Chapter 6
Risk Results
In this chapter we obtain numerical results, primarily in the form of the annual rate of
derailments and the rates of various delay events for different SEWS systems. These
results are presented in section 6.1 and they are for different coastal systems, while the
wayside system is operating as at present. To aid interpretation, the total rates are
decomposed by earthquake magnitude M, track location s, seismic source, and epicentral
distance. The sensitivity of the total rates to various physical and modeling parameters is
displayed at the end of this section. A scenario-based approach to the risk is presented in
section 6.2. In this case, the results are in terms of the expected number of various events
(derailments and delays) along the track, given that an earthquake of given magnitude
occurs at a specific location.
The effects of different modes of operation of the wayside system are described in
Chapter 7, where the issue of the optimization of the SEWS is addressed.
6.1 Annual Risk
Annual Rates of Derailments and Delays and their Decomposition
This section shows in some detail the performance characteristics of different SEWS
systems while the wayside system is operated as at present, with parameters (a 10,c, Ainspl,
Ainsp2) = (40, 80, 120 gals). The trigger parameters of the coastal system, a (System A),
b (System B), and c (System C) are varied. For derailments (rate XDE), we present
results including or excluding the contribution from resumption of service after short
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delays. The rates are plotted in Figure 6.1 a and the corresponding parameters a*, b* and c*
are shown in Figure 6. lb. Notice that the rates XMD and XLD do not depend on either the
type of coastal system or its operational parameters (they depend only on the operation of
the wayside system). These rates are therefore just listed. The two sets of plots in Figure
6.2a correspond to including (upper plots) or excluding (lower plots) derailments
following short delays. For the current coastal system (System A, with a* = 40gals), the
rates are:
- XDE = 0.017 / 0.033 trains/year (for exclusion/inclusion of derailments
following short delays)
- XSD = 82.6 trains/year
- MD= 3.38 trains/year
- XLD = 1.20 trains/year
The performance of the system during the past eleven years shows an annual average of
2.8 stopped and 72.4 delayed trains; see Chapter 2. These "delayed trains" correspond to
the sum of short and medium delays when trains resume regular or low-speed operation
respectively. "Stopped trains" correspond to long delays when trains stop to allow for on-
foot track inspection. Therefore, we conclude that our theoretical results for the various
delays are consistent with the historical record. The annual rate of derailments cannot be
verified historically because such events are rare. Other observations on the results of
Figure 6.1 are as follows:
Effect of Coastal System
Coastal system A (the present system) is consistently outperformed by systems B and C.
This is due to the fact that, allowing any coastal station to stop trains (as systems B and C
do) increases the lead time relative to the arrival of the strong phase of ground motion at
the track. The lead time of system A is short and the reduction in the rate of derailments
relative to operating only the wayside system (leftmost points in the plots) is small. At the
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same time, the low threshold value (a* = 40gals) produces many short delays. In general,
System C (UrEDAS) performs best, because of the added lead time when triggering
occurs upon the arrival of P waves. This is actually true for values of the threshold
parameter c < 3.1. For less conservative values of c* (when the coastal system is not
expected to issue frequent warnings), the large uncertainty in the estimation of earthquake
magnitude and location makes the UrEDAS system somewhat less efficient than System
B.
Quantitatively, the differences noted above are hardly significant, especially if the
systems are operated with higher trigger levels. At most, system B reduces the derailment
risk by 50% compared to system A and system C may potentially add a further 10%
reduction to this risk. These are, however, upper limits and correspond to very
conservative operation of the systems (rightmost points in the plots). More realistic
settings of the trigger parameters make the benefits smaller. Even smaller percentile
differences are found if the risk of derailment after resumption of service following short
delays is included (top plots in Figure 6.1 a). This is because the added risk is independent
of the type of coastal system.
The small gains from changing the type of coastal system are attributed to the fact that, in
spite of the lead time from operation of the coastal system (up to approximately 30 sec for
the UrEDAS), the braking trains cover a large part of their braking distance course after
the arrival of the strong motion phase at the track (for a speed of 245kmh, the total
braking time is approximately 85 sec).
Effect of Wayside Policy
The wayside system can potentially cause the trains to brake after the arrival of the strong
phase of ground motion at the track. Even such action, without lead time, is effective as it
causes trains to cover approximately 3 km while braking as opposed to half the distance
between trains running in the same direction when trains are not stopped. For example,
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the distance between consecutive trains traveling in the same direction between Tokyo
and Sendai is approximately 28 km. Thus, the trigger level of the wayside system, if set
conservatively, as it now is, largely controls the risk of derailment. The coastal policy
may reduce that risk, but not by a large amount.
The inspection levels at the track control completely the medium and long delays, while
the short delays are controlled by both the coastal and wayside systems.
The added risk due to the resumption of operation after short delays is a function of the
wayside system. Figure 6.1a shows that this added risk may be very significant. The
reason is that, given M and x, the quantities am. and Sa at the track are treated as
conditionally independent. Therefore, low recorded values of am. that produce short
delays do not necessarily imply that Sa (which is better related to damage) is also small. It
should be noted that, although conservative, the assumption of conditional independence
of amax and Sa is consistent with observations from strong ground motions. Later in this
study, we shall present results for the case in which the wayside system operates in terms
of Sa. In that case, the resumption of operation after short delays does not contribute
significant risk.
Next we analyze how the annual rates kE for various events E (derailments and various
delays) are contributed by earthquakes of different magnitudes and with different
distances from the track, how they are contributed by different earthquake sources, and
how they are distributed along the track. Illustrated in Figure 6.2 is the risk
decomposition for the current operation of the SEWS, i.e. (a', atloc, Ainspl, Ainsp2) = (40,
40, 80, 120 gals) excluding the added risk of derailments following short delays. More
specifically, we present the annual rates of each event type E decomposed according to
earthquake magnitude, track segment, seismic source and epicentral distance. For more
effective comparison, the rates are presented normalized.
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Decomposition by earthquake magnitude
Derailments are mostly caused by earthquakes magnitudes from 7 to 8.5, whereas, long,
medium and short delays are produced mainly by earthquakes of magnitudes 70.5,
6.5+±0.5 and 5.5+±0.5, respectively. There is no contribution to the risk from earthquakes
of magnitude M > 8.5, because it is believed that there are no seismic sources that can
produce such large magnitude earthquakes in the area of interest; see Table 4.1.
Furthermore, there are "jumps" in the contribution to the risk from earthquakes
immediately smaller and larger of 7.5 and 8, because these values correspond to our
estimates of maximum magnitude for several seismic sources. Therefore, as the
magnitude of the earthquake gets larger, there are fewer seismic sources that can
potentially produce earthquakes of that magnitude.
Distribution along the track
The area of operational segments 12-16 is the one where most derailments and delays are
expected to occur. Segments 18-21 are those where derailments and delays have the
lowest rate of occurrence.
The significant variability of the risk along the line is due to the following site-specific
parameters: (a) proximity to seismic sources, (b) traffic load, (c) length of tunnels, and
(d) local soil conditions. The effects of these parameters are studied via comparative
analysis of the following cases:
- case 1I: Same train frequency along the entire line (E[Ns] = 0.295)
Soil Type I everywhere.
No tunnels.
-case 2: Same as case 1, but actual train frequency considered.
- case 3: Same as case 2, but actual soil types along the Tohoku line considered.
- case 4: Same as case 3, but tunnels considered (most realistic or base-case)
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Figures 6.3 presents the distribution along the track of the rates of all events for the four
cases listed above. Case 1 shows that seismicity alone causes a relatively uniform
distribution of the risk along the track (at the most, the local rate of derailments varies by
a factor of 3). The density of train traffic induces variations by up to a factor of 2.5.
Inclusion of soil type alters significantly the spatial distribution of risk. Specifically, soil
type III reduces the rate of derailments by a factor of almost 10 while it increases
insignificantly the rates of all delays, whereas soil type II increases the risk of both
derailments and delays by a factor of at the most 4. These large differences are due to
local amplification effects; see Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The amplification by soil type II is
consistent at all magnitudes for both am, and Sa. Soil type III causes small amplifications
of am at the small magnitudes that generally cause delays. On the other hand, soil type
III does not amplify the value of Sa at the large magnitudes that cause derailments. In
addition, the viaduct has been constructed expecting an amplification of motion for soil
type III (soil coefficient 1.2; see Table 2.4). Therefore, the risk of derailment is reduced
significantly in operational segments where there is predominantly soil type III. Finally,
the tunnels along the line reduce locally the derailment risk by a factor up to 3, but have
no effect on the delay rates.
Decomposition by seismic source
Seismic sources 6 and 8 contribute by far the most to the annual rate of all events. This is
a combined effect of their relative proximity to the track and their high seismic activity;
see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1. By contrast, seismic sources I and 15 contribute very little
to the risk mainly because of their large distance from the track, sources 7 and 11
contribute little because of their low seismicity and seismic source 5 contributes
insignificantly because of both low seismic activity and large distance.
Decomposition by epicentral distance
Derailments and long delays are mostly caused by earthquakes that originate about
130km from the track. Medium and short delays are predominantly produced by
earthquakes with epicentral distances around 150 and 160 k, respectively. In general,
92
the range of crucial epicentral distances for all rates is from 100 to 170 km. Shorter
distances are not significant because there are no seismically active offshore sources that
are closer to the track. Larger distances are unimportant due to attenuation.
Sensitivity of Annual Risk
Uncertainty on the value of model parameters was discussed in detail in previous
chapters. In this section, we present the potential effect of the estimation errors on the
results in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. Sensitivity analyses are made relative to: (a) attenuation
parameters, (b) the seismic fragility of the viaduct structure, (c) the soil classification
along the Tohoku line, (d) the speed of Shinkansen, (e) seismicity parameters and (f) the
(M, x) estimation accuracy of the UrEDAS system.
This study shows that annual risk is very sensitive to parameters (a), (b) and (c) listed
above. In more detail, we have:
Sensitivity to attenuation coefficients
The attenuation model used in the previous analysis is a modification of the model of
Kawashima et al.(1984) to account for an apparent overestimation of the motion at small
magnitudes; see Figure 4.3a. Yet, the records from the recent Kobe earthquake suggest
that the model may underestimate grossly the strong motion at relatively high
magnitudes; see Figure 4.6. Therefore, in a sensitivity analysis we consider a calibration
of the median attenuated value of both ama and Sa, to the values recorded during the
Kobe earthquake: we maintain the form of the previous models (see equation 4.3) but the
parameters a and b of the equation are estimated so as to: (a) reproduce the median values
of the modified-Kawashima model for M = 5, and (b) increase by a factor of 1.8 the
values for M = 7.2 (the magnitude of the Kobe earthquake).
Figure 6.4 presents the sensitivity of the annual risk to the attenuation coefficients. Three
sets of coefficients are considered; coefficients corresponding to (1) the "modified
Kawashima" model (Table 4.3), (2) the original Kawashima model (Table 4.3) and, (3)
93
the "modified Kawashima" model adjusted to account for accelerations recorded during
the Kobe earthquake, as discussed above. Figure 6.4a gives the rates excluding the added
risk of derailments following resumption of service after short delays, whereas in Figure
6.4b this risk in included. Figure 6.5 shows the sensitivity of the annual risk
decomposition by earthquake magnitude to the attenuation coefficients.
The value of the attenuation coefficients affects significantly the annual rate of
derailments (by a factor of 2 to 8) and long delays (by a factor of 1.5 to 3.6). However,
the sensitivity for medium and short delays is much lower (1.9 and 1.3 respectively). The
original Kawashima model estimates larger median accelerations at small magnitudes
(M=5 - 6) than any of the other two models. Therefore, it produces a higher annual rate of
short delays. The "adjusted to Kobe" model estimates larger median accelerations at high
magnitudes (M=7 - 8) than any of the other two models. Thus, it estimates that the annual
rates of derailments and long delays are higher than what assessed by the other two
models. For medium delays, both the original Kawashima and the "adjusted to Kobe"
model produce values higher than the modified Kawashima model, because of the higher
median accelerations predicted for intermediate magnitudes (M=6 - 7).
The added risk of derailments following the resumption of service after short delays does
not alter significantly the sensitivity to the attenuation coefficients. In general, sensitivity
analysis results are similar for cases that exclude or include this added risk. Therefore, for
the rest of this sensitivity analysis we present and comment only on results when this
added risk is excluded. Corresponding results including this risk are presented in
Appendix I.
Sensitivity to the seismic fragility of the viaduct structure
In this case, uncertainty lies in the values of the following parameters: (a) the relative
displacement of the top of the viaduct at yielding, by, which might be smaller than
originally estimated (values 15 and 30% smaller areconsidered), (b) the ductility ratio at
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failure, A., which again may be smaller than the base-case value of 4 (sensitivity values of
2 and 3 are considered), (c) the logarithmic standard deviation of the seismic resistance of
the structure, aftlnR, which is varied by + 0.1 relative to the base-case of 0.4 and, (d) the
parameter cl in equation (5.6), which controls the clustering of damage along the line; for
el, we consider a 2fold decrease and increase relative to the base-case value of 0.03. A
2fold increase in the value of c, corresponds to a 2fold decrease in the length of the
continuously damaged track sections.
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show the sensitivity of the annual risk to the values of the relative
displacement at yielding by, the ductility p., the value of a~nR and finally the value of cl.
The rates of various delays are not influenced by the uncertainty in the fragility of the
viaduct structure of the Tohoku line. Therefore, Figure 6.8 gives only the sensitivity of
the decomposition by earthquake magnitude of the rate of derailments.
The derailment risk is mostly influenced by the values of 8y and alnR, as the uncertainty in
their value produces risks different by factors up to 4 and 3.5. The sensitivity to the
values of and cl may leads to values of risk different by factors up to 2.8 and 1.5
respectively. The sensitivity of the annual risk to the value of 6y and is attributed the
uncertainty in the values of these fragility parameters which influences accordingly the
value of the median resistance of the structure. In addition, the difference in the values of
the considered fragility parameters causes mainly a uniform scaling of the contribution of
all earthquake magnitudes. The caused change in the relative contribution of different
earthquake magnitudes is less important.
Sensitivity to soil classification along the Tohoku line
Tables 2.3, 2.4 introduce the soil classification along the line code used for the
construction of the Tohoku Shinkansen continuous viaduct structure. Table 2.5 gives the
approximate soil classification per operational segment used in this analysis. In Chapter
4, the soil types of the proposed attenuation model are presented; see Table 4.2. Based on
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information in these tables, there are three possible sources of uncertainty in the soil
classification along the line: (a) The three soil types of the JNR code (Table 2.4) do not
coincide exactly with the three soil types of the proposed attenuation model (Table 4.2),
(b) the seismic design recommendations of the JNR code (Table 2.4) imply a specific
expected influence of soil type on the acceleration, somewhat different than what the
attenuation model estimates (see Chapter 4), and least importantly (c) the soil
classification along the line, as provided from a personal communication with JREast
(Table 2.3), is rather crude and engineering judgment was necessary for the
implementation of this classification in the risk analysis as presented in Table 2.5.
In order to assess the sensitivity of the annual rates to the soil classification along the line,
we performed the following analyses that essentially bracket the possible effect: given
that the viaduct is constructed according to the soil classification and design
recommendations of the JNR seismic code, we assumed that the whole track is soil type I,
II or III according to the attenuation model; this effect is presented in Figure 6.9a. The
performance of the SEWS under these uniform soil conditions is compared to the
performance of the system presented in Figure 6.1, that corresponds to the soil
classification presented in Table 2.5, which is predominantly soil type II. To enhance our
understanding of the sensitivity of the annual rates to the soil classification, we present
Figure 6.10 that illustrates the decomposition by earthquake magnitude of all rates for the
studied uniform soil classifications. Important for gaining insight in these effects of soil
type are Figures 4.4 and 4.5, where the median attenuated values of am,, and Sa for all soil
types and earthquake magnitudes are presented.
Of all measures of performance of the early warning system, the annual rate of
derailments is the most sensitive to the soil classification along the line (up to a factor of
7). The various delays are less sensitive: long, medium and short delays have factors of
difference as large as 3, 2.8 and 2.5 respectively. All these large sensitivities correspond
to the case that, the soil classification is unifonrmely type I and lead to relatively lower
values for both rates of derailments and delays. This because the median values of both
96
amax and Sa for soil type I are consistently lower than those for soil type II, i.e. the
predominant soil type along the line.
For soil type II the factors of influence for derailments, short, medium and long delays
are 1.75, 1.14, 1.09 and 1.01 respectively, i.e. smaller than those for soil type I. The
influence is smaller because the proposed soil classification is predominantly soil type II.
Moreover, for this soil type derailments, long, and medium delays are relatively larger
than the values for the proposed soil classification, while the effect is reversed for short
delays. This is due to the fact that the latter are mainly caused by small magnitudes (M <
6), as opposed to the rest that are primarily produced by larger magnitudes (M > 6) and
the influence of soil type on the median values of small magnitudes is different than that
for large earthquake magnitudes.
Finally, for soil type III the factors of influence for derailments, short, medium and long
delays are 1.3, 1.18, 1.20 and 1.1. In this case, the annual rate of long delays is estimated
larger than for the proposed soil classification. This is due to the relatively higher
attenuated values of am,, for large magnitudes and soil type III as opposed to those for
soil type II. This is not the case for Sa and large earthquake magnitudes that controls the
rate of derailments, nor for a and smaller magnitudes that control the other types of
delays. For these cases, soil type II is estimated to amplify the motion more than soil type
III.
In conclusion, sensitivity to the attenuation coefficients, the seismic fragility of the
viaduct structure and the soil classification along the Tohoku line is very significant
(factors of influnce up to 8, 4 and 7). Therefore, accurate estimations of the attenuation
law, the seismic fragility and the soil classification are considered much needed
endeavors, which are however beyond the scope of the present study.
97
In contrast, it is found that annual risk is relatively insensitive to the Shinkansen
operating speed, to the seismicity parameters and the (M, x) estimation accuracy of the
UrEDAS system. More specifically:
Sensitivity to Shinkansen operating speed
In order to investigate the effect of the train operating speed on the performance of the
SEWS, we performed an analysis for the following cases: (a) VO = 210 kmh, to study
how much benefit in the risk would be introduced by a reduction of the current operating
speed (Vo=245kmh), and (b) Vo = 300 kmh, to study the effect on the seismic risk along
the line if JREast decided to increase the operational speed of the Shinkansen for more
efficient transportation of its passengers. Figure 6.9b displays the sensitivity of the annual
rates of derailment and various delays to the value of the operating speed. This analysis
assumes that a train derails if it meets damaged track, independent of the speed of the
train at the time when it reaches the damaged section of the track. In this perspective:
The operating speed has no effect on the delays produced by the operation of the early
warning system. This is because the system orders emergency braking based on the
recorded ground acceleration, that is not related to the speed of the Shinkansen. For the
rate of derailments, an increase of the operating speed to 300kmh would cause an increase
of 35%, whereas a decrease of the speed to 21 Okmh would produce a reduction of the risk
of approximately 25%. This is because a train running at 300kmh has a braking distance
of 4.4 km (see equation 5.28), as opposed to the braking distances of 2.9 km for
Vo=245kmh and 2.1 km for Vo=210 kmh. It is obvious that, the larger the braking
distance of the train, the larger the probability that it travels over a damaged portion of
the track and thus the larger the annual rate of derailments.
Sensitivity to seismicity parameters
The main uncertain parameters of the earthquake recurrence model are maximum
earthquake magnitudes Mmnax and the b-values of the Gutenberg-Richter relation. To
evaluate sensitivity to these parameters, analyses were performed assuming that, relative
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to the base-case values: (a) the maximum magnitude Mma of each seismic source is 0.5
(JMA units) higher/lower and (b) b = 0.9 or 1.1 for all seismic sources (as opposed to an
overall average of about 1.0).
Figure 6.1 la shows sensitivity of the annual rates to the value of Mmx. The rate of
derailments is the one most sensitive to Mmax, with increase/decrease factor of about 2.
This is because derailments are induced by large accelerations that originate from large
magnitude earthquakes. Short, medium and long delays are relatively insensitive to Mm.
Sensitivity of the annual rates to the b-parameter is shown in Figure 6.1 lb. Notice that,
according to equation (4.1), the earthquake rate density is independent of b for M = 6.
Therefore, an increase of b corresponds to both an increase in the rate of earthquakes with
M < 6 and a decrease in the rate of earthquakes with M > 6. Because of this "pivoting
effect", changing b affects significantly the rate of very large earthquakes and therefore
the rate of derailments.
Sensitivity to (M, A) estimation accuracy of the UrEDAS system
As presented in Chapter 4, the estimation accuracy of the UrEDAS system is an issue of
considerable uncertainty. In order to study the sensitivity of the annual risk to this
parameter, we consider the following cases for the P waves estimation (the S waves
estimation is not considered as this system provides relative benefit if it adds lead time
with respect to the arrival of the S waves):
- aMp = CtM,s = 0.5 (JMA units), assuming an improvement of the P waves
estimation of the earthquake magnitude to the levels of the current
estimation accuracy of the S wave.
- ca,p = 25% A or 100% A, assuming that the P waves epicentral distance
estimation is 3 times more or 1.3 times less accurate than
the base-case value.
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The sensitivity of the annual rates to the accuracy of the UrEDAS system is presented in
Figure 6.12a and 6.12b. The former plot gives the effect of the magnitude estimation
accuracy and the latter the effect of the epicentral distance estimation. More specifically,
The annual risk is sensitive to the UrEDAS estimation accuracy only for relatively non
conservative operation of the system, i.e. for c>2.2; see Figure 6.1. For smaller values of
the coastal parameter, the uncertainty on the prediction of (M, x) does not affect the
system, as the latter is set to trigger often enough that the estimation accuracy of the
system does not reduce the probability of triggering. Moreover, the sensitivity to the
magnitude estimation accuracy is relatively more important than that to the epicentral
location estimation. This is because the UrEDAS system triggers based on the estimated
values of M and logoA and thus the importance of the epicentral distance is smaller given
that it is logj0A and not A itself that causes the potential emergency braking.
The rate of medium and long delays are not influenced by the UrEDAS estimation
accuracy, because these measures of performance of the early warning system are
controlled completely by the wayside system; see initial discussion of section 6.1.
Moreover, derailments are practically insensitive to the estimation accuracy of the
UrEDAS, whereas for the rate of short delays an improvement in the M estimation upon
the arrival of the P waves, would reduce the short delays by 65%. The considered large
range of the accuracy of the epicentral distance estimation causes only a 25%
decrease/increase in the rate of short delays.
In conclusion, sensitivity to the Shinkansen operating speed, the seismicity parameters
and the (M, x) estimation accuracy of the UrEDAS system is relatively unimportant
(factors of influence up to 1.35, 2.0 and 1.65 respectively).
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6.2 Scenario-Based Risk Analysis
Probability of event occurring at a specific track segment s, given M, x and SEWS
Figure 6.13 presents the conditional probabilities P[EIM, x, s, A] for events E = DE
(derailment), SD (short delay), MD (medium delay) or LD (long delay). The location of
the earthquake x, is fixed at (E142°15', N40°12'), that is offshore North-East of Morioka.
Actually, the epicenter is located 571 km from Tokyo and just 135 km from Morioka.
Moreover earthquake magnitude M is varied between 5 and 9 (JMA units), and the
segment number from s =1 (Tokyo) to s =26 (Morioka). The case portrayed corresponds
to the current SEWS, the setting of which can be summarized by: (a, at loc, Ainspl, Ainsp2)
= (40, 40, 80, 120 gals), where a, at,,c are the coastal and wayside trigger parameters and
Ainspi Ainsp2 are the track inspection levels. The probability of derailment does not
include derailment events after resumption of service following short delays. The
following features of Figure 6.13 should be noted:
As earthquake magnitude increases, the probabilities of derailment and long delay
increase throughout the line. This is because such events require high ground
accelerations. On the other hand, the probabilities of short and medium delays, which
occur at lower accelerations, the effect of magnitude is not monotonic.
Although all probabilities show general trends along the line, there are sharp peaks and
valleys in these curves due mainly to (a) local soil conditions, (b) the fraction of segment
length in tunnels and, for the case of derailments and short delays, (c) the assignment of
track segments to coastal stations. For example, the decrease in the probability of
derailment in operational segment 11 is mainly due to the fact that in this segment the soil
is relatively soft (soil type III) as opposed to the neighboring segments where the soil is
normal (soil type II). This sensitivity to local soil conditions can be seen in Figure 4.5
which shows that, at large magnitudes, the median Sa for soil type II is higher than that
for soil type III.
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These qualitative features of P[EIM, x, s, SEWS] are common to all SEWS systems and
trigger level settings. Similar plots for all alternative coastal systems and equivalent, in
terms of risk, trigger levels are included in the Appendix I for further reference.
Expected number of events occurring throughout the line, given M, x and SEWS.
In this section, we estimate the expected number of derailments, short, medium and long
delays that would occur throughout the line for a specific setting of the SEWS, given an
earthquake of magnitude M that takes place at an epicentral location x. This is performed
by taking into account the conditional probabilities presented in the previous section, as
well as the expected number of trains per track segment (Table 2.6). The results of this
study are presented in the following format: Each point of a map of the region yields the
number of derailments and different kinds of delays caused along the line, if an
earthquake of magnitude M occurred at that given point. For ease of presentation, these
results are presented with the use of contours. Hence, Figures 6.14 through 6.17 present
the expected number of derailments, short, medium and long delays for the current SEWS
system, i.e. (a, atoc Anspl, Ansp2) = (40, 40, 80, 120gals), and for earthquakes of
magnitudes M 5 up to 8 respectively. There is a certain limitation to the accuracy of these
figures, because the area of seismic interest is offshore and thus we have ignored the
inland seismicity. This assumption results in no illustrated effects from potential inland
earthquakes, as well as in a series of"artificial" contours between the zero inland activity
and the maximum values estimated in the geographic areas closest to the line.
This approach may be misleading in the attempt to identify the most potentially
dangerous seismic areas, as it does not take into account the historical seismicity of each
area. Thus, the location of the most or least potentially dangerous seismic areas could
change if the latter parameter is taken into account. Nevertheless, it provides a more
tangible estimate of the risk than what is conveyed by the annual rates. At any generic
moment of time, there are approximately 14 trains all along the line. This number is the
maximum potential value of the sum of short, medium and long delays at any epicentral
location and for any earthquake magnitude. Hence,
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Regarding the expected number of derailments, the relatively most dangerous area for the
Tohoku line is south of Tokyo (around E140°, N35°). Somewhat smaller risk causes the
area south-east of Sendai (around E141°30', N37°). The expected number of derailments
decreases consistently with epicentral distance from the track.
For magnitudes between 5 and 7, the most short delays are produced by an area northeast
of Sendai (around E141°30', N38°). In this magnitude range, the expected number of
short delays decreases consistently with epicentral distance from the line. This trends
reverses for larger magnitudes (M = 8), because short delays occur for low peak ground
accelerations which for an earthquake of magnitude 8 can occur only for relatively larger
epicentral distances.
Similarly, the expected number of medium delays decreases with epicentral distance for
earthquakes of magnitudes between 5 and 7, while this tendency is inverted for
earthquakes of magnitude 8 for the reason mentioned above. For earthquakes in the range
between 5 and 7, most medium delays are caused by earthquakes in the areas described as
the most dangerous in terms of short delays. In contrast, for an earthquake of magnitude
8, it is the area around (E142° , N36°), almost 160km from the track that may cause a
maximum of 3 medium delays.
The area that produces the most long delays is the area south-east of Sendai, while the
area south of Tokyo produces fewer. In this case, the expected number of long delays
decreases consistently with epicentral distance from the line.
The qualitative features of the expected number of events, conditional to M and _x, are
common to all SEWS systems and trigger level settings.
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Figure 6.1: (a) Annual rates of derailments and various delays, excluding and
including derailment risk due to resumption of operation following short
delays, for coastal systems A, B and C and (atoc Ainsp, Ainsp2)=(40 , 80, 120gals)
(b) Coastal trigger parameter versus annual rate of short delays,
for coastal systems A, B and C and (at,lo, Ainspi Ainsp2 =(40, 80, 120gals).
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Figure 6.9: Annual rates of derailments and various delays, excluding derailment
risk due to resumption of operation following short delays for
coastal systems A, B and C and (atloc, Ansp, Ainsp2) = (40, 80, 120gals), if:
(a) soil type is I, II, III (Table 4.2) all along the line
(b) maximum velocity, Vo = 210kmh, 245kmh(base-case value), 300kmh.
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Figure 6.12: Annual rates of derailments and various delays, excluding derailment
risk due to resumption of operation following short delays for
coastal systems A, B and C and (atoc-Ainsp1, Ainsp2) = (40, 80, 120gals) for:
the UrEDAS system accuracy of P-wave estimation of:
(a) earthquake magnitude M: atM,P = 0.5, 1.0(base-case value)
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Figure 6.14: Expected number of events throughout the line, given
earthcquake of magnitude M = 5 occurring at map location,
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earthquake of magnitude M = 7 occurring at map location,
for (a at,loc, Ainspli Ainsp2) = (40, 40, 80, 120gals), where events are:
(a) derailments, (b) short delays, (c) medium delays, (d) long delays.
119
Derailments - M=7
1
Derailments - M=8
139 140 141 142 143
Medium Delays - M=8
2
139 140 141 142 143
Long Delays - M=8
138 139 140 141 142 143
Figure 6.17: Expected number of events throughout the line, given
earthquake of magnitude M = 8 occurring at map location,
for (a atboc, AinspI, Ainsp2) = (40, 40, 80, 120gals), where events are:
(a) derailments, (b) short delays, (c) medium delays, (d) long delays.
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Chapter 7
Optimization of the Seismic Early Warning System
By choosing the most appropriate system and by modifying the operational parameters,
the performance of the SEWS can be improved in the sense of reducing the current rate of
delays, reducing the rate of derailments, or both. Optimization of the SEWS is pursued in
a stepwise fashion, considering at each step the effect of modifying one additional
parameter relative to the previous step. The parameters involved are: (a) the coastal
system (A, B and C) and its trigger level (respectively, a*, b* and c*), (b) the trigger and
inspection levels of the wayside system, and (c) the seismic intensity parameter used by
the wayside system (ground acceleration or spectral acceleration at the natural period of
the viaduct). For reference, the estimated derailment and delay rates of the current SEWS
systems (in trains/year) are:
- XDE = 0.017 (after resumption of service following short delays: 0.033)
- XSD = 82.6
- XMD = 3.38
- XLD = 1.20
As noted in Chapter 6, if the measure of seismic intensity used by the wayside system is
peak ground acceleration amax, the calculated value of XDE after resumption of operation
following short delays rests on conservative assumptions and should be regarded as an
upper bound. This is because we have assumed that amax and the spectral acceleration Sa
along the track are conditionally independent, given the earthquake magnitude and
epicentral location. Another reason why such rate is not very accurate is that its value is
sensitive to the fragility of the viaduct at low levels of ground motion, which is not well
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known. The estimated derailment rates when Sa is used as ground motion intensity by the
wayside system should be more accurate.
7.1 Optimization when the Wayside System Operates on amax
In order to reduce the current high rate of short delays, one might consider increasing the
trigger level of the present coastal system. All the rest remains the same. This action
might be justified, as the risk of derailment is insensitive to the trigger level at the coast,
a', whereas varying a can change the annual rate of short delays by orders of magnitude;
see Figure 7.1. Using the results for coastal system A, one can see from Figure 7.1 that by
raising the coastal parameter a above the current value of 40 gals, for example to 80gals,
the rate of short delays can be reduced by 50%, with small increases in the derailment
risk (about 5%). The benefits from this modification of the current SEWS system are
however small relative to other modifications discussed below. The choice of a does not
affect the rates of medium and long delays, which are determined entirely by the wayside
system.
A second possible modification would be to raise the triggering level of the wayside
system, a, to the first track inspection level, Ainspi. Setting at,,lo = Anspl would
eliminate what we believe is a misconception in the current setting of the wayside system
parameters, as there is no need for trains to be stopped if no track inspection is deemed
necessary. The time delay between the instants when a truly strong motion exceeds 40
and 80 gals is very short and has no appreciable effect on the rate of derailment. If at,, is
set to the current value of AinspI (80 gals), then only the coastal system would produce
short delays. These residual short delays are inevitable, given that ground motion
intensity at the coastal stations and at the track are not deterministically related. The rate
of short delays would become zero only if the coastal system was decommissioned.
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Figure 7.2 compares the performance of the three coastal systems for atloc=Ainspj=80 gals
with that under the current setting (at ,1o=40gals, Ainspl=80gals). Meaningful comparisons
in this case should be in terms of the rates following resumption of operation; see Figure
7.2b. If the coastal system is operated with a = 80gals, the rate of short delays drops to
11.7 trains/year, while the rate of derailments remains practically the same. Again, a
change of atloc does not affect the rates of medium and long delays. A modification in this
sense is considered definitely worthwhile. In all subsequent analyses, we have therefore
set avloc=Ainspl-.
The effect of changing the inspection levels Ainspl and Ainsp2 (currently set at 80gals and
120gals) is shown in Figure 7.3, where results are presented for three settings: (ao,
Ainspl, Ainsp2) (80, 80, 120 gals), (100, 100, 140 gals) and (120, 120, 160 gals). As one
would expect, raising these levels produces higher rates of derailment, for any given
value of SD. However, the tradeoff is in this case with the rates of medium and long
delays, which are reduced substantially. Moreover, after including the added risk due to
derailments following short delays, the differences between coastal systems are
insignificant; see the flat curves in Figure 7.3. This is attributed to the fact that, after
resumption of service following short delays, almost all trains (except the medium and
long delays) have covered the same track length (half the length between consecutive
trains heading in the same direction) irrespective of whether they were stopped initially
by the coastal system.
A more direct illustration of the tradeoff is provided in Figure 7.4 where, for System A
and a* = 80 gals, the values of the 4 annual rates after the resumption of operation of the
short delays are plotted against Ainsp, while always keeping Ainsp2 = Ainspt + 40 gals.
Plots for the other two coastal systems and for any other values of a* are qualitatively
similar. Table 7.1 indicates a possible alternative to the current setting of system A, as
well as alternatives using systems B and C. These alternatives show that the effect of the
coastal system and its trigger level, while nonzero, is not significant. More specifically,
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system B outperforms system A, and System B may be outperformed by system C, in
terms of the rates of derailments and short delays.
7.2 Optimization when the Wayside System Operates on Sa
A better measure of seismic intensity to use at the wayside is the response spectrum
acceleration for T = 0.4sec and 5% of critical damping. The performance of the SEWS
after this modification is quantified in Figure 7.5 for the case when the triggering levels at
the wayside are (Satjoc, Sinspl, Sinsp2)=(8 0, 160, 240gals). A noteworthy difference
relative to the use of amax,, is that the added risk from service resumption after short delays
is unnoticeable, at least for the relatively low value of Ainspj = 160gals used in this figure.
This is due to the fact that the low spectral accelerations that induce short delays produce
insignificant track damage. Therefore, resumption of service following a short delay does
not increase the risk of derailments by significant amounts. This effect of changing from
an ama-based to an Sa-based operation of the wayside system is a very significant step in
the optimization procedure of this system.
In order to draw conclusions from a direct comparison of the performance of the SEWS
with an amax-based versus an Sa-based operation of the wayside system, we need to
introduce comparable trigger and track inspection levels for amax and Sa. By comparing
the median attenuated values of aax and Sa for different magnitudes we conclude that the
levels of Sa are two times higher than those of aax on average, given earthquake
magnitude and epicentral distance; see Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Therefore, trigger and track
inspection levels in terms of Sa twice as high as those in terms of a,, are considered
comparable for the purpose of this study.
The general effect of this modification is presented in Figure 7.6. In this figure, we
compare the ama-based wayside system with (aloc, Ains, Ansp 2 )(80, 80, 120gals) to the
Sa-based system with (Satloc, Sainspl, Sainsp2)=( 1 6 0 , 160, 240gals). Regarding the rate of
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derailments excluding the added risk from the resumption of service following short
delays, the proposed change in the wayside system is not important when the coastal
system triggers frequently but becomes significantly beneficial when the coastal system
triggers rarely. Using Sa rather than ama, can reduce the risk of derailments by as much as
50%. This decrease is due to the fact that Sa is a better parameter than amax to predict track
damage. Therefore, earthquakes with high damage potential tend to trigger the wayside
system when such systems operates on Sa. This is not the case when the wayside system
operates on ama,, given the low level of probabilistic dependence between am,,x and track
damage. The increased protection from a wayside system operating on Sa also reduces the
importance of the coastal system. This is shown in Figure 7.6, where the coastal trigger
level is seen to have smaller effect on the derailment risk, when Sa is used by the wayside
system.
Operating the wayside system on Sa is effective in reducing the derailment risk after the
resumption of service following short delays (reduction of the total risk by about 50%
relative to using amax). This condition is independent of the trigger level of the coastal
system. Essentially, the risk of derailment from resumption of service after short delays
has been eliminated.
The effect of changing the trigger and inspection levels of the wayside system is shown in
Figure 7.7, where results are presented for (Sailoc, S a,isnpl, S ainsp2)=(160, 160, 240 gals),
(240, 240, 320 gals) and (400, 400, 480 gals). The qualitative features of this figure are
similar to those of Figure 7.3 for the case of an a-based wayside system. There is,
however, a very significant decrease in the rates of delays.
In order to identify the best setting of the coastal and wayside trigger parameters for an
Sa-based wayside system, we observe that the value of the coastal parameter should be set
to produce an annual rate of short delays in the (approximate) range of 1 to 100; having
more than 100 expected short delays per year would probably result in inefficient
performance of the system, while having fewer than 1/year would lead to a virtual
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elimination of the coastal system. The latter action would probably be judged unwise in
the case of a very large damaging event. Also, the value of the wayside trigger level,
Sat,loc should be set between 250 and 400 gals: setting Sat,,oc < 250gals is suboptimal as
such conservative values do not appreciably reduce the risk of derailment, while Satoc >
400gals produces what we consider as excessively high derailment risk. Figures 7.8
through 7.10 show the values of the derailment and delay rates within the above ranges of
the coastal and local trigger parameters, for each of the three coastal systems. The
derailment rates plotted in these figures include the risk from resumption of service
following short delays. In all cases, the wayside parameters have the form: (Satjo, Sainspl
SaJinsp2)=(Satloc, S atoc, Stloc+ 8Ogals). The following conclusions can be reached from
examination of Figures 7.8 - 7.10:
The annual rate of derailment is mainly a function of Satloc. The coastal system becomes
influential only for low values of the coastal parameter. Coastal system C is somewhat
more influential on the overall performance of the SEWS than system B, which in turn is
more influential than system A.
The annual rate of short delays depends almost exclusively on the coastal trigger
parameter. This rate increases slightly as Sat,loc increases.
Medium and long delay rates are functions only of the wayside trigger levels. Their sum,
, + D, is governed by Ainspl, whereas the relative value of the two rates is affected by
Aijp2. Therefore, the setting of Ainsp2 should be based on the desirability of an on-train
inspection (resulting in medium delays) versus on-foot inspection of the tracks (resulting
in long delays). This decision should be based on the value of Sa recorded by the closest
wayside accelerometer. To aid making this choice, we have estimated the probability of a
train meeting damaged track in 35km (one half of the distance between trains traveling in
the same direction), given Sa at the track. This probability is plotted in Figure 7.11 for the
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range of the parameter ct that controls the spatial clustering of damage that we consider
reasonable; see Section 6.1 and Figure 6.8b.
Table 7.2 gives the rates of derailment and of various delays for three specific settings of
Systems A, B and C while the wayside system operates on Sa. These alternative systems,
use identical settings of the Sa trigger levels for the wayside accelerometers. The results
show that the effect of using different coastal systems, although not zero, is small.
By comparing Tables 7.1 and 7.2, one can see that using an Sa-based wayside system
reduces very significantly all delays, in addition to reducing the derailment risk after
resumption of operation following short delays by about 50%.
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Annual Current: Alternative Al: Alternative BI: Alternative Cl:
Rates System A System A System B System C
a* = 40gals a* = 60 gals b* - 60 gals c = 3.20
(40,80, 120 gals) (" (100,100,140gals)(1) (100,100,140gals) (1 ) (100,100,140gals)O
XDE 0.017 (0.033)"" 0.029 (0.038) ~ 0.023 (0.037) O 0.021 (0.036) ®
ISD 82.6 24.1 20.4 19.3
XMD 3.38 1.51 1.51 1.51
XLD 1.20 0.69 0.69 0.69
(1) The values in parentheses correspond to the setting of the wayside system (at, Ainspl Anp 2).
(2) The values in parentheses correspond to the rate of derailments including the deailment risk due to
resumption of service following short delays.
Table 7.1: Performance of alternative SEWS systems, using am,,, as the intensity
parameter at the wayside stations.
Annual Current: Alternative A2: Alternative B2: Alternative C2:
Rates System A System A System B System C
a = 40gals a = 80 gals b* = 120 gals c = 4.00
(40,80, 120 gals)' ) (280,280,360gals)( ) (280,280,360gals) (1 (280,280,360gas)(O
XDE 0.017 (0.033)` 0.015 (0.015) 0.015 (0.015) 0.015 (0.015)
XSD 82.6 12.4 1.2 1.7
MID 3.38 0.18 0.18 0.18
XLD 1.20 0.16 0.16 0.16
(1) The values in parentheses correspond to the setting of the wayside system (S,to Snp, Si..p2).
(2) The values in parentheses correspond to the rate of derailments including the derailment risk due to
resumption of service following short delays.
Table 7.2: Performance of alternative SEWS systems, using Sa as the intensity
parameter at the wayside stations.
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Figure 7.1: (a) Annual rates of derailments and various delays, excluding and
including derailment risk due to resumption of operation following short
delays, for coastal systems A, B and C and (atloc Ainspl Ainsp2)=(4 0, 80, 120gals)
(b) Coastal trigger parameter versus annual rate of short delays,
for coastal systems A, B and C and (atjo,, Ainspl Ainsp2)=(4 0, 80, 120gals).
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Figure 7.2: Annual rates of derailments and-various delays, for coastal systems
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Figure 7.3: Annual rates of derailments and various delays, for coastal systems
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(a) excluding derailment risk due to resumption of service following short delays
(b) including derailment risk due to resumption of service following short delays
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Figure 74: Expected number of event E versus Ainspl, for coastal system A,
a = 80gals, at.iOc=AinspI and Ainsp2=Ainspl + 4 0 g al s and including
derailment risk due to resumption of service following short delays, where E is:
(a) Ederailments, (b) E=short delays, (c) E=medium delays, (d) E=long delays.
132
u,
ci
.wO
0
ci
m
<
f f I I
.-_
! ! ! 
0
0
I
X
1c
0 2
1
IU
1C
)U 10I
0
10 2
Annual Rate of Short Delays
103 104
101 102 10 3
Annual Rate o Short Delays
104
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(b) Coastal trigger parameter versus annual rate of short delays,
for coastal systems A, B and C and (Sat loc, Sa inspl, Sa, insp2)(80 , 160, 240gals)
133
10-t
03C
c'
._
0
-0
C
C
-3
... "* " ' . . . . [ · '. · - *·I*w 
A-.
B-
C--
Annual Rate of Medium Delays =1.05
Annual Rate of Long Delays =0.53
- - I .11 .
1U
a,
-
E 1
CZ
.
"I
CZ
B -
5OxC* --
I no
I I . I . I . . . . . I . .
. - I . . I 
- . I . I
I .Z I
d ,3
a,.: (80, 80, 120gals)
S,: (160, 160, 240gals)
Annual Rate of Medium Delays =3.38
Annual Rate of Long Delays =1.20
Annual Rate of Medium Delays =1.05
Annual Rate of Long Delays =0.53
100 l1I 102
Annual Rate of Short Delays
~~1 0 210 102
Annual Rate of Short Delays
10 3 10 4
10 3 104
Figure 7.6:Annual rates of derailments and various delays, for coastal systems
A, B, C and cases (at,j, Ainspl Ainsp2)--(80, 80, 120gals) versus
(Satoc, Sa,inspl, Sainsp2)=(60, 160, 240gals).
(a) excluding derailment risk due to resumption of service following short delays
(b) including derailment risk due to resumption of service following short delays
134
10 - 1
A-.
B-
C-
n
au
0)
oE
a)
a
0)
Cc'
-s
e-
10 - 2
t n-3
-110
lU
CoEC
0)
E$
ra)a
0
3
C
10 - 2
A-.
B - Annual Rate of Medium Delays =3.38
C Annual Rate of Long Delays =1.20
-- ~ ~ - -'..- - - - -
-- -- -- ' .-m  . . . . - -
Annual Rate of Medium Delays =1.05
Annual Rate of Long Delays =0.53
, , ! ,,,_ ...... I. .......-. ..
-110 10
I I I . I . . . . . . . . . , . , I I I . . . . . I I . . I I . . I .
. . . . . I . I - - . I -  . . I - - - - - - - --
- . -. , - - - - - . - . - - . -
- - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -
. _-I
_
_t1 i - 3
(,)r,C
0
._ 10 -1
0
0
0
Wcc
'-'a 2
_. lo'
10-1 100 101 102 103 104
Annual Rate of Short Delays
A-. Annual Rate of Medium Delays =0.05
B - Annual Rate of Long Delays =0.05C-
e(0~~~~~~~~ ~Annual Rate of Medium Delays =0.30
m Annual Rate of Long Delays =0.23
. 10 1
~~E~~~~~~ ~~Annual Rate of Medium Delays =1.05
0
Annual Rate of Long Delays =0.53
a,
: . ._ =._._._._._._._._._._._._.~~~~~~~~,d~w , =. ,
102 =
10-; "' '"'" " '"~ .- m.. .. , = =
10 10 ° 10' 102 103 104
Annual Rate of Short Delays
Figure 7.7: Annual rates of derailments and various delays, for coastal systems
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Figure 7.11: Probability of a train meeting damaged track in 35km, given
spectral acceleration at the track, for c = 0.015, 0.03, 0.06, i.e. a reasonable
range of spatial clustering of damage.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
This study investigated the effectiveness of the current Seismic Early Warning System
(SEWS) for the Tohoku Shinkansen and proposed alternatives for its future operation.
The early warning system is composed of a set of accelerometers along the track
(wayside system) and a set of accelerometers along the eastern coast of Honshu (coastal
system), halfway between the track and the most dangerous offshore seismic sources.
Each accelerometer of the wayside network may cause emergency braking of all trains
within the track segment that it controls (total of 26 segments). In this way, trains do not
continue travelling along potentially damaged tracks and thus the risk of derailment is
reduced. The purpose of the coastal system is to further reduce the distance that trains
travel over potentially damaged tracks by ordering emergency braking before the strong
phase of ground motion arrives at the track. The current performance of the early warning
system has been found to be sub-optimal. To improve it we have studied the effect of
changing three characteristics of the early warning system: (1) the mode of operation of
the coastal system, (2) the intensity parameter used at the wayside to make decisions
about train stopping, inspection procedures and resumption of service and (3) the trigger
levels for both the wayside and the coastal systems. Regarding the first characteristic,
three alternative coastal systems (A, B and C) were considered. System A is the current
system for which each coastal accelerometer controls a prespecified track section.
Systems B and C allow any of the coastal accelerometers to cause emergency braking of
trains anywhere along the Tohoku line, if the level of ground shaking calls for such an
action. The difference between systems B and C is that the latter assumes that at the
location of each of the coastal accelerometers there is the potential for issuing an earlier
warning, i.e. upon the arrival of the P waves. A system that is capable of this early
operation is the UrEDAS system (Nakamura, 1988 and 1989), which is based on real-
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1) The estimated rate of derailments along the entire Tokyo-Morioka line under current
operation of the SEWS system is 0.017 events/year excluding the risk during the
resumption of service after short delays and about 0.033 if that additional risk is included.
These values correspond roughly to 2-3 derailments occurring every 100 years.
2) For the present low trigger horizontal acceleration of the wayside system (40gals), the
rate of derailments is insensitive to the type of coastal system. Under very conservative
settings of the coastal parameters, coastal system B could reduce the risk of derailment by
about 50% relative to system A, and system C could potentially reduce the risk by an
additional 10%. These benefits are smaller for realistic settings of the coastal system
parameters. Even smaller percentile differences among the three coastal systems are
found if the risk of derailment after short delays is included; see Figure 6.1.
3) The setting of the coastal system may influence by several orders of magnitude the
frequency of short delays. On the other hand, the coastal system does not affect the rate of
medium and long delays; see Figure 6.1.
4) The current low setting of the trigger acceleration for the wayside system is the
primary cause for the reduction of derailment risk by the present SEWS system. The track
inspection levels determine the rates of medium and long delays; see Figure 6.1.
Regarding the decomposition of the annual rates by earthquake magnitude seismic
source and epicentral distance and the distribution of these rates along the Tohoku line,
we have found that:
1) Derailments are caused for the most part by earthquake magnitudes from 7 to 8.5.
Long, medium and short delays are caused mainly be earthquakes of magnitudes 70.5,
6.5+0.5 and 5.5+0.5 respectively; see Figure 6.2.
2) Most undesired events (derailments and various delays) are expected to occur within
operational segments 12 through 16. Such events are most infrequent in operational
segments 18 through 21. The variability of the risk along the Tohoku line is influenced
mainly by the local soil conditions and by the fraction of track that runs in tunnels. An
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additional factor is the traffic load and the proximity of the line to the main seismic
sources; see Figures 6.2 and 6.3.
3) Seismic sources 6 and 8 contribute the most to the annual rate of all undesired events,
whereas sources 1, 5, 7, 11, 15 contribute the least. These contributions are the combined
effects of the proximity of the sources to the track and their seismic activity; see Figures
4.2 and 6.2.
4) Derailments and long delays are mostly caused by earthquakes with epicentral
locations about 130 km from the track. The corresponding predominant epicentral
distances for medium and short delays are around 150 and 160 km respectively; see
Figure 6.2.
Seismic risk was found to be very sensitive to the value of the attenuation coefficients,
the seismic fragility of the viaduct structure and the soil classification along the Tohoku
line. More precisely:
1) The annual rates of derailment and long delays are very sensitive (factor of influence
up to 8 and 3.6, respectively) to the form of the attenuation equation of earthquake
ground motion, while the attenuation law affects marginally the rates of medium and
short delays; see Figure 6.5.
2) The seismic fragility of the viaduct structure is very influential on the estimated rate of
derailment. The fragility model is composed of various parameters. The most influential
are the relative displacement of the viaduct deck at yielding, by, and the uncertainty on
the ultimate resistance in terms of spectral acceleration, CIlnR, (up to factors of 4 and 3.5,
respectively). The ductility ratio at failure, p., and the spatial clustering of damaged track
sections controlled by the parameter cl have moderate effects; see Figures 6.6 and 6.7.
3) The rates of derailment and long delays are very sensitive to the soil conditions along
the Tohoku line (up to factors of 7 and 3, respectively), whereas the rates of medium and
short delays are affected less by such conditions; see Figure 6.9a.
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In contrast, seismic risk is not significantly sensitive to the speed of Shinkansen trains, to
the seismicity parameters and the (M, x) estimation accuracy of the UrEDAS system.
More specifically, we have found that the speed of the trains has a small effect on the
derailment risk. This varies by a factor of 1.3 on average, for either an increase to
300kmh or a decrease to 210kmh of the current operational speed of 245kmh. Moreover,
a change in train speed was found not to affect any of the delay rates; see Figure 6.9b.
Furthermore, the rate of derailment changes by a factor of about 2 with reasonable
variations in the seismicity level, while the rates of various delays are even less sensitive
to seismicity; see Figure 6.11. Finally, only the annual rate of short delays is moderately
sensitive (potential reduction by 65%) to the magnitude estimation accuracy of the
UrEDAS system using P waves. The annual rate of short delays is much less sensitive to
the accuracy of estimation of the epicentral location x for P waves. The estimation
accuracy of the system has unimportant effects on the rate of derailment and does not
affect the rates of medium and long delays which are completely controlled by the
wayside system. The estimation accuracy of the UrEDAS system using S waves has no
notable effect on the values of any of the rates. See Figure 6.12 for an illustration of these
results.
Risk based on Scenario Analyses
For earthquakes of different magnitudes with fixed epicentral location, the probabilities
of derailment and long delays increase monotonically and considerably with increasing
earthquake magnitude. On the other hand, the probabilities of medium and short delays
are not monotonic. Although the probabilities of all undesired events (derailments and
various delays) show general trends along the line, there are abrupt increases and
decreases in their values due mainly to local soil conditions and to the fraction of segment
length in tunnels. For system A and for the case of derailments and short delays, these
peaks and valleys are also influenced by the fixed assignment of track segments to the
coastal stations; see Figure 6.13.
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For the expected number of undesired events. as a function of earthquake magnitude and
epicentral location, we find that the largest number of derailments would be expected
from an offshore earthquake with epicentral location south of Tokyo (around E140°,
N35°). A somewhat lower derailment risk is associated with events south-east of Sendai
(around E141°30', N38°). These are also the events that cause the largest expected
number of long delays; see Figures 6.14 - 6.17.
Optimization of the Seismic Early Warning System
The most beneficial changes to the current early warning systems in order of decreasing
importance are:
Operate the wayside system on spectral acceleration Sa rather than peak ground
acceleration am. Doing so reduces significantly the rates of derailments and of various
delays. The benefit from changing the intensity parameter of the wayside system from
am.,, to Sa, is especially large if risk from the resumption of service after short delays is
included. This is because Sa is a far better indicator of structural damage than am is; see
Figure 7.6.
Set the wayside trigger level equal to the first track inspection level. Doing so reduces
significantly the total number of short delays, which are then produced exclusively by the
coastal system. In addition, if the coastal system was put out of operation, all short delays
would be eliminated; see Figure 7.2.
Increase the wayside trigger and track inspection levels. This action reduces significantly
the rates of medium and short delays, increases moderately the rate of derailments, and
affects minimally the rate of short delays; see Figure 7.8. The value of the first track
inspection level governs the total rate of medium or long delays. The relative allocation
of this total rate to medium and long delays depends on the second track inspection level.
Therefore, the setting of the second track inspection level should be based on the
perceived necessity for on-train versus on-foot inspection of the track, as a function of the
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value of Sa recorded at nearby stations. Figure 7.11 should be of aid in making this
decision.
Increase the coastal trigger level, which reduces significantly the rate of short delays and
increases only moderately the rate of derailments; see Figure 7.8
This study showed that the coastal system is relatively ineffective in reducing earthquake
risk. Specifically, Systems B and C have comparable effectiveness and both outperform
System A, but the overall benefit of changing the present system to B or C is marginal.
Overall, the recommended changes in the early warning system may reduce the annual
rate of derailments by a factor of 2 and the total expected number of delayed trains by a
factor of 40 on average; see Table 7.2.
Propagation of Delay along the Tohoku Line
Second order delay time, which is the aggregated delay time from all trains along the line
due to the fact that trains are not able to proceed due to stopped or delayed trains ahead,
increases the first order delay time by about 30%. First order delay time is the aggregated
delay time from all trains along the line ignoring propagation of delay effects and
corresponds to the rate of delayed and stopped trains as obtained in Chapters 6 and 7.
Including third order delay, which corresponds to train cancellations, increases the first
order delay time by a factor of about 2.
Future Work
The sensitivity results presented in Chapter 6 and summarized above point at the need to
make a more detailed evaluation of several factors that affect the seismic risk of the
Tohoku Shinkansen line. Priority areas of investigation appear to be: (a) the form and
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coefficients of the attenuation law. (b) the seismic fragility of the viaduct structure, in
particular the relative displacement at yielding, 6,., the ductility ratio at yielding, g, and
the uncertainty on the seismic resistance. GIlnR, and (c) the soil conditions and their
potential seismic amplification along the line.
The present study is focused on offshore seismicity. Incorporation of inland seismicity
would produce more accurate estimates of the total seismic risk, especially in the Tokyo
region. A more detailed analysis of propagation of delays throughout the Tohoku
Shinkansen is advisable. Such a study could take into account actual trains schedules and
train and station locations.
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Appendix I
Additional Tables and Figures
Appendix I contains the following: (a) tables that give the point estimates of the trigger
parameter y(i,s,R) of System B (see Chapter 3) and, (b) figures that are qualitatively
similar to the ones presented in Chapters 6 and 7. These are presented for a more
complete interpretation of the performance of the early warning system for the Tohoku
Shinkansen. The figures convey the following main results: (a) Changing from the
current coastal system A to coastal systems B or C leads to a more uniform distribution of
short delays along the line; see Figures -1 and I-2, (b) Changing from peak ground
acceleration to response spectrum acceleration as the measure of seismic intensity at the
wayside system increases the contribution of higher earthquake magnitudes to the rates of
all undesired events (derailments and various delays); see Figures I-3, I-4 and -5, (c)
Including the risk of derailments after resumption of trains following short delays reduces
the differences in performance of different coastal systems; see Figures I-6 through 1-10
and (d) Changing from the current coastal system A to coastal systems B and C alleviates
most abrupt "jumps" in the conditional probability of short delays along the line, as this is
no longer a function of the scope of control of the coastal accelerometers; see Figures I-
11 and 1-12.
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i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 i=6 i=7 i=8
3.84 2.57 1.75 1.42 1.12 0.96 0.73 0.61
3.82 2.55 1.74 1.41 1.11 0.96 0.72 0.61
3.78 2.53 1.72 1.40 1.10 0.95 0.71 0.60
3.71 2.48 1.69 1.37 1.08 0.93 0.70 0.59
3.61 2.41 1.65 1.33 1.05 0.91 0.68 0.58
3.47 2.32 1.58 1.28 1.01 0.87 0.66 0.55
3.32 2.22 1.52 1.23 0.97 0.83 0.63 0.53
3.17 2.12 1.45 1.18 0.93 0.80 0.60 0.51
3.03 2.03 1.39 1.13 0.89 0.77 0.58 0.49
2.89 1.94 1.33 1.08 0.85 0.73 0.55 0.47
2.10 1.41 0.97 0.78 0.62 0.53 0.40 0.34
2.63 1.76 1.21 0.98 0.77 0.67 0.50 0.43
2.50 1.68 1.15 0.94 0.74 0.64 0.48 0.41
2.36 1.59 1.09 0.89 0.70 0.60 0.46 0.38
2.21 1.49 1.02 0.83 0.66 0.57 0.43 0.36
2.12 1.43 0.98 0.80 0.63 0.54 0.41 0.35
2.03 1.37 0.94 0.77 0.61 0.52 0.39 0.33
3.50 2.36 1.63 1.32 1.05 0.90 0.68 0.58
3.34 2.25 1.56 1.27 1.00 0.86 0.65 0.55
3.15 2.13 1.47 1.20 0.95 0.82 0.62 0.52
2.90 1.96 1.36 1.11 0.88 0.76 0.57 0.48
1.50 1.02 0.71 0.58 0.46 0.39 0.30 0.25
1.09 0.74 0.52 0.42 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.18
1.36 0.93 0.64 0.52 0.42 0.36 0.27 0.23
1.00 0.69 0.48 0.39 0.31 0.27 0.20 0.17
1.30 0.89 0.62 0.50 0.40 0.34 0.26 0.22
Table I-1: System B: values of y(i, s, R) for earthquakes originating from
"sector of origin" R= 1.
[Columns: coastal station, i=1-8; Rows: segment, s=1-26]
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i=l i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 i=6 i=7 i=8
2.13 2.57 2.09 1.71 1.24 1.08 0.78 0.61
2.12 2.57 2.08 1.71 1.24 1.08 0.78 0.61
2.11 2.55 2.07 1.70 1.24 1.07 0.78 0.61
2.07 2.50 2.03 1.67 1.21 1.05 0.76 0.60
2.01 2.43 1.97 1.62 1.18 1.02 0.74 0.58
1.92 2.33 1.89 1.55 1.13 0.98 0.71 0.56
1.84 2.22 1.80 1.48 1.08 0.93 0.68 0.53
1.75 2.12 1.72 1.41 1.03 0.89 0.65 0.51
1.68 2.03 1.65 1.35 0.98 0.85 0.62 0.49
1.59 1.92 1.56 1.28 0.93 0.81 0.59 0.46
1.14 1.38 1.12 0.92 0.67 0.58 0.42 0.33
1.42 1.72 1.40 1.15 0.83 0.72 0.53 0.41
1.36 1.64 1.33 1.10 0.80 0.69 0.50 0.39
1.29 1.55 1.26 1.04 0.76 0.66 0.48 0.37
1.20 1.44 1.17 0.97 0.70 0.61 0.44 0.35
1.14 1.37 1.11 0.92 0.67 0.58 0.42 0.33
1.08 1.31 1.06 0.88 0.64 0.55 0.40 0.32
1.89 2.27 1.85 1.53 1.11 0.97 0.70 0.55
1.83 2.20 1.80 1.48 1.08 0.94 0.68 0.53
1.74 2.10 1.71 1.41 1.03 0.90 0.65 0.51
1.63 1.97 1.61 1.33 0.97 0.84 0.61 0.48
0.88 1.06 0.87 0.72 0.52 0.46 0.33 0.26
0.67 0.81 0.66 0.55 0.40 0.35 0.25 0.20
0.87 1.05 0.86 0.71 0.52 0.45 0.33 0.26
0.66 0.80 0.66 0.55 0.40 0.35 0.25 0.20
0.88 1.07 0.88 0.73 0.53 0.46 0.34 0.26
Table I-2: System B: values of y(i, s, R) for earthquakes originating from
"sector of origin" R=2.
[Columns: coastal station, i=l-8; Rows: segment, s=1-26]
153
i=l i-=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 i=6 i=7 i=8
1.47 2.54 3.44 2.61 1.56 1.27 0.82 0.61
1.46 2.53 3.42 2.60 1.55 1.27 0.82 0.60
1.45 2.51 3.40 2.59 1.54 1.26 0.81 0.60
1.42 2.45 3.31 2.52 1.50 1.23 0.79 0.59
1.37 2.36 3.19 2.43 1.45 1.18 0.76 0.56
1.29 2.23 3.01 2.29 1.37 1.12 0.72 0.53
1.22 2.10 2.83 2.16 1.29 1.06 0.68 0.50
1.15 1.98 2.66 2.03 1.22 1.00 0.65 0.48
1.09 1.87 2.50 1.92 1.15 0.94 0.61 0.45
1.01 1.73 2.32 1.78 1.07 0.88 0.57 0.42
0.72 1.22 1.63 1.26 0.76 0.62 0.40 0.30
0.88 1.49 1.99 1.53 0.93 0.76 0.49 0.36
0.83 1.41 1.87 1.44 0.87 0.72 0.47 0.34
0.77 1.31 1.73 1.34 0.82 0.67 0.44 0.32
0.70 1.19 1.56 1.22 0.74 0.61 0.40 0.29
0.65 1.10 1.44 1.13 0.69 0.57 0.37 0.27
0.61 1.03 1.34 1.05 0.65 0.53 0.35 0.26
1.06 1.78 2.31 1.82 1.12 0.93 0.61 0.45
1.04 1.73 2.25 1.78 1.10 0.91 0.60 0.44
0.99 1.65 2.14 1.70 1.05 0.87 0.57 0.42
0.95 1.58 2.04 1.63 1.01 0.84 0.55 0.41
0.52 0.87 1.12 0.90 0.56 0.46 0.30 0.22
0.41 0.68 0.88 0.71 0.44 0.36 0.24 0.18
0.56 0.94 1.22 0.98 0.60 0.50 0.33 0.24
0.45 0.74 0.97 0.78 0.48 0.40 0.26 0.19
0.62 1.03 1.35 1.08 0.66 0.55 0.36 0.26
Table I-3: System B: values of y(i, s, R) for earthquakes originating from
"sector of origin" R=3.
[Columns: coastal station, i=1-8; Rows: segment, s=1-26]
154
i-= i--2 i=3 i-=4 i=5 i=6 i=7 i=8
0.89 1.37 2.22 2.95 1.84 1.54 0.88 0.60
0.89 1.37 2.21 2.94 1.84 1.54 0.88 0.60
0.88 1.36 2.20 2.93 1.83 1.53 0.87 0.59
0.86 1.33 2.14 2.85 1.78 1.49 0.85 0.58
0.82 1.27 2.05 2.72 1.70 1.43 0.82 0.56
0.77 1.19 1.92 2.55 1.59 1.34 0.77 0.52
0.72 1.12 1.80 2.37 1.49 1.25 0.72 0.49
0.68 1.05 1.68 2.22 1.39 1.17 0.67 0.46
0.64 0.99 1.58 2.08 1.31 1.10 0.63 0.43
0.59 0.91 1.45 1.90 1.20 1.01 0.58 0.40
0.41 0.63 1.01 1.32 0.84 0.71 0.41 0.28
0.50 0.77 1.23 1.60 1.02 0.86 0.50 0.34
0.48 0.74 1.16 1.52 0.97 0.82 0.48 0.32
0.45 0.70 1.09 1.42 0.92 0.78 0.45 0.31
0.42 0.64 1.00 1.30 0.84 0.72 0.42 0.28
0.39 0.60 0.93 1.20 0.79 0.67 0.39 0.27
0.37 0.57 0.88 1.14 0.75 0.64 0.38 0.25
0.67 1.02 1.59 2.05 1.35 1.16 0.68 0.46
0.68 1.04 1.61 2.08 1.38 1.18 0.69 0.47
0.70 1.06 1.65 2.14 1.42 1.22 0.71 0.48
0.71 1.08 1.67 2.18 1.45 1.25 0.72 0.49
0.40 0.62 0.96 1.26 0.84 0.72 0.42 0.28
0.34 0.51 0.80 1.05 0.70 0.60 0.34 0.23
0.47 0.72 1.14 1.50 0.99 0.85 0.49 0.33
0.39 0.59 0.93 1.23 0.81 0.69 0.40 0.27
0.54 0.82 1.30 1.73 1.14 0.97 0.55 0.38
Table I-4: System B: values of y(i, s, R) for earthquakes originating from
"sector of origin" R=4.
[Columns: coastal station, i=1-8; Rows: segment, s=1-26]
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i=-1 i=--2 i=3 i=4 i=5 i=6 i=7 i=8
0.56 0.81 1.31 2.14 2.63 2.35 0.92 0.58
0.55 0.80 1.30 2.13 2.62 2.34 0.92 0.58
0.55 0.80 1.29 2.11 2.60 2.32 0.91 0.57
0.53 0.77 1.24 2.04 2.51 2.24 0.88 0.55
0.50 0.73 1.17 1.93 2.37 2.11 0.83 0.52
0.46 0.67 1.08 1.77 2.17 1.94 0.76 0.48
0.42 0.61 0.98 1.61 1.98 1.77 0.70 0.44
0.38 0.56 0.90 1.48 1.81 1.62 0.64 0.40
0.35 0.51 0.83 1.36 1.67 1.49 0.59 0.37
0.31 0.46 0.74 1.21 1.48 1.33 0.52 0.33
0.21 0.31 0.50 0.81 1.00 0.89 0.35 0.22
0.25 0.37 0.60 0.98 1.20 1.07 0.42 0.27
0.25 0.36 0.58 0.94 1.15 1.04 0.41 0.26
0.24 0.35 0.56 0.92 1.13 1.01 0.40 0.25
0.23 0.33 0.54 0.88 1.08 0.97 0.38 0.24
0.22 0.32 0.52 0.85 1.04 0.94 0.37 0.23
0.22 0.32 0.52 0.85 1.04 0.94 0.37 0.23
0.41 0.59 0.95 1.56 1.91 1.73 0.68 0.43
0.45 0.65 1.05 1.72 2.11 1.91 0.75 0.47
0.50 0.73 1.17 1.91 2.35 2.12 0.84 0.52
0.54 0.79 1.27 2.07 2.55 2.30 0.91 0.57
0.34 0.49 0.79 1.29 1.58 1.43 0.56 0.35
0.29 0.42 0.67 1.10 1.36 1.22 0.48 0.30
0.41 0.60 0.97 1.59 1.96 1.76 0.69 0.43
0.34 0.50 0.81 1.32 1.63 1.46 0.57 0.36
0.48 0.70 1.13 1.85 2.28 2.05 0.81 0.50
Table I-5: System B: values of y(i, s, R) for earthquakes originating from
"sector of origin" R=5.
[Columns: coastal station, i=1-8; Rows: segment, s=1-26]
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i=l i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 i-=6 i--7 i=8
0.41 0.55 0.78 1.06 1.31 1.87 1.10 0.59
0.40 0.55 0.78 1.06 1.31 1.86 1.10 0.59
0.41 0.55 0.78 1.06 1.31 1.87 1.10 0.59
0.40 0.55 0.77 1.04 1.29 1.84 1.09 0.58
0.38 0.52 0.73 0.99 1.22 1.74 1.03 0.55
0.36 0.49 0.69 0.93 1.14 1.61 0.96 0.52
0.34 0.46 0.64 0.87 1.07 1.51 0.91 0.49
0.32 0.44 0.62 0.83 1.02 1.44 0.87 0.47
0.31 0.42 0.59 0.80 0.98 1.38 0.84 0.45
0.29 0.39 0.55 0.75 0.91 1.29 0.79 0.42
0.21 0.28 0.40 0.53 0.65 0.92 0.57 0.30
0.27 0.36 0.51 0.68 0.83 1.19 0.74 0.39
0.27 0.36 0.51 0.69 0.84 1.20 0.75 0.40
0.28 0.38 0.53 0.71 0.87 1.25 0.78 0.41
0.29 0.39 0.54 0.73 0.90 1.31 0.82 0.43
0.29 0.39 0.55 0.74 0.92 1.34 0.84 0.44
0.29 0.40 0.56 0.75 0.93 1.36 0.85 0.45
0.55 0.74 1.04 1.40 1.74 2.56 1.60 0.83
0.59 0.80 1.12 1.51 1.89 2.78 1.73 0.90
0.63 0.86 1.20 1.62 2.04 3.01 1.86 0.97
0.67 0.91 1.27 1.72 2.17 3.21 1.98 1.03
0.40 0.54 0.76 1.03 1.30 1.93 1.19 0.62
0.33 0.45 0.63 0.85 1.08 1.61 0.98 0.51
0.46 0.63 0.89 1.20 1.52 2.26 1.38 0.72
0.38 0.51 0.72 0.98 1.24 1.84 1.12 0.58
0.52 0.71 1.00 1.35 1.71 2.54 1.55 0.80
Table -6: System B: values of y(i, s, R) for earthquakes originating from
"sector of origin" R=6.
[Columns: coastal station, i=1-8; Rows: segment, s=1-26]
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i=l i--2 i=3 i=4 i=5 i=6 i=7 i=8
0.20 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.47 0.64 1.30 0.69
0.20 0.25 0.32 0.38 0.47 0.65 1.31 0.69
0.21 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.49 0.67 1.36 0.72
0.22 0.27 0.34 0.42 0.51 0.70 1.44 0.76
0.23 0.28 0.35 0.42 0.52 0.71 1.47 0.78
0.23 0.28 0.35 0.42 0.52 0.71 1.47 0.79
0.23 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.52 0.72 1.49 0.81
0.24 0.29 0.37 0.44 0.54 0.74 1.56 0.85
0.25 0.31 0.39 0.47 0.57 0.78 1.66 0.90
0.26 0.32 0.40 0.48 0.59 0.81 1.74 0.95
0.20 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.46 0.63 1.37 0.74
0.27 0.34 0.42 0.51 0.63 0.85 1.86 1.01
0.29 0.35 0.44 0.53 0.66 0.89 1.96 1.07
0.31 0.38 0.47 0.57 0.70 0.96 2.11 1.14
0.33 0.40 0.50 0.61 0.75 1.02 2.27 1.22
0.35 0.43 0.53 0.64 0.79 1.08 2.40 1.29
0.35 0.44 0.54 0.66 0.81 1.11 2.47 1.33
0.67 0.82 1.02 1.23 1.53 2.08 4.66 2.50
0.71 0.87 1.09 1.31 1.62 2.21 4.95 2.65
0.74 0.91 1.14 1.38 1.71 2.33 5.23 2.79
0.78 0.96 1.20 1.44 1.79 2.44 5.49 2.92
0.46 0.56 0.70 0.85 1.05 1.43 3.22 1.71
0.37 0.45 0.57 0.68 0.85 1.16 2.60 1.38
0.50 0.62 0.78 0.94 1.16 1.59 3.57 1.89
0.40 0.49 0.62 0.75 0.93 1.27 2.85 1.51
0.55 0.67 0.84 1.01 1.26 1.72 3.87 2.04
Table I-7: System B: values of y(i, s, R) for earthquakes originating from
"sector of origin" R=7.
[Columns: coastal station, il-8; Rows: segment, s=1-26]
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i=l i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 i=6 i=7 i=8
0.13 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.54 0.99
0.13 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.31 0.55 1.02
0.14 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.58 1.06
0.14 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.35 0.62 1.14
0.16 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.37 0.67 1.24
0.17 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.40 0.72 1.34
0.18 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.36 0.44 0.80 1.48
0.20 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.40 0.49 0.89 1.66
0.23 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.44 0.54 0.99 1.85
0.24 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.48 0.59 1.07 2.01
0.20 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.39 0.48 0.88 1.65
0.28 0.33 0.39 0.45 0.55 0.68 1.23 2.32
0.30 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.59 0.72 1.32 2.49
0.32 0.37 0.44 0.51 0.63 0.77 1.41 2.67
0.34 0.40 0.48 0.55 0.68 0.83 1.51 2.86
0.37 0.43 0.51 0.58 0.72 0.88 1.62 3.06
0.38 0.44 0.53 0.60 0.75 0.92 1.67 3.17
0.71 0.83 0.99 1.14 1.41 1.73 3.16 6.00
0.75 0.88 1.04 1.20 1.48 1.82 3.33 6.31
0.78 0.91 1.09 1.25 1.55 1.90 3.47 6.59
0.81 0.95 1.13 1.30 1.61 1.98 3.62 6.88
0.47 0.55 0.66 0.76 0.94 1.15 2.11 4.00
0.38 0.44 0.52 0.60 0.75 0.92 1.68 3.19
0.51 0.60 0.71 0.82 1.01 1.24 2.28 4.33
0.40 0.47 0.56 0.65 0.80 0.98 1.80 3.43
0.54 0.63 0.75 0.87 1.08 1.32 2.43 4.61
Table 1-8: System B: values of y(i, s, R) for earthquakes originating from
"sector of origin" R=8.
[Columns: coastal station, i=1-8; Rows: segment, s=1-26]
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Figure I-1: Normalized risk decomposition for (b ,a,-Ioc, Ainp, Ainsp2) =
(40, 40, 80, 120gals): (a) by earthquake magnitude, (b) along the track,
(c) by seismic source, and (d) by epicentral distance
[Figure similar to Figure 6.2]
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[Figure corresponds to cases illustrated in Figure 6.6]
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Figure 1-7: Annual rates of derailments and various delays, including derailment
risk due to resumption of operation following short delays for
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[Figure corresponds to cases illustrated in Figure 6.7]
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Figure I-11: Conditional probability P[EIM, x, s, B] of event E along the line,
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[Figure similar to Figure 6.13, but for coastal system B]
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Figure 1-12: Conditional probability P[EIM, x, s, C] of event E along the line,
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[Figure similar to Figure 6.13, but for coastal system C]
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Appendix II
Propagation of Delay
Trains that have been cleared by the wayside system to resume regular operation after an
earthquake may not be able to do so if there are trains stopped by the SEWS further along
the line. This operational constraint increases the total number of delayed trains all along
the Tohoku line. The magnitude of the increase is analyzed in this section under some
simplifying assumptions, which however allow us to estimate the size of the effect and its
dependence on various parameters. In our model, we consider a track 320km long
composed of 16 operational segments of equal length, as a representation of the actual
line between Tokyo and Sendai. Stations are assumed to be located every 2 operational
segments. Traffic load is one of the most influential parameters in the propagation of
delays along the line; here we consider three possible train frequencies: (a) one train in
each operational segment (for a total of 16 trains, 8 in each direction of travel), (b) one
train every two operational segments (total of 8 trains, 4 in each direction of travel) and
(c) one train every three operational segments (total of 6 trains, 3 in each direction of
travel). All trains are assumed to be located midway within the operational segment they
occupy when they are stopped by the SEWS and are equally spaced in each direction; see
Figure II-1.
A scenario-based approach is used to study the propagation of delays. Thus, earthquakes
of different magnitudes (M=5, 6, 7 and 8) are considered to occur at different distances
(D=60, 100 and 140km) from the midpoint of the track; see Figure II-1. We further
assume that the accelerations measured by the wayside accelerometers are the median
values given by the attenuation relations (Table 4.3). Moreover. given the fact that along
this line we have predominantly soil type II (Table 4.2), we assume this to be true
uniformly along the model line. The values of peak ground acceleration for soil type II
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along the track, given M and x, are presented in Figure II-2. Assuming that all trains
along the line have been stopped by either the coastal or the wayside system. the total
number of trains is subdivided into short. medium and short delay events, depending on
the value of the two track inspection levels AjnspI and Ainsp 2 and the median attenuated
peak ground accelerations for soil type II. In this analysis. we consider constant track
inspection levels, which correspond to the current settings, i.e. Aspl=80gals and
Ainsp2 =120gals; see Figure II-2.
In order to compare different delay patterns, we calculate the total duration in minutes of
each type of delay. We assume that on-foot inspection of the tracks (long delay) requires
30 minutes, during which the train remains stopped (JREast. personal communication).
Following a short delay, we assume that the train is able to catch up by increasing its
speed within the normal operational limits. After resumption of operation, such trains are
assumed to operate with an average speed of 200kmh. Finally, in the case of a medium
delay, trains continue operation at low speed (40kmh) until they reach the next vacant
station. During this 30 minute period, a train traveling at 40kmh accumulates 24 minutes
of delay compared to regular operation. In general, trains are being dispatched regularly
from Tokyo and Sendai during this inspection period. These trains continue their travel
until the furthest vacant station with a speed that depends on the level of acceleration
recorded in each segment, i.e. 40 or 200kmh corresponding to medium or short delays.
Trains are canceled if there are no vacant stations ahead or if the recorded accelerations
call for on-foot inspection of the track segment immediately neighboring the dispatching
stations. In order to account for train cancellations in the total delay time, we assign a
nominal value of delay per cancelled train equal to 96 minutes. This is the time that a
Shinkansen train needs to travel all the 320km of the line at a speed of 200kmh. Finally,
we assume that no more than one train traveling in the same direction can be in the same
10km track section at any one time.
An example of the resumption of operation of the model line after the operation of the
SEWS is presented in Figure II-3. This figure shows only half the total track (from 0 to
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160km and operational segments 1-8) and only half of the trains due to symmetry. For an
earthquake of M=7 and D=60km (see Figure II-1). the recorded values of amxa compared
to the two track inspection levels call for on-foot inspection in segments 7 and 8 (from
120 to 160km), for on-train inspection in segments 4 5 and 6 (from 60 to 120km) and
allow immediate resumption of regular operation of trains in segments 1. 2 and 3 (from 0
to 60km); see Figure II-2. Figure II-3 shows the locations of the 8 trains included in this
track section versus time after resumption of operation. Of these 8 trains, 2 trains remain
stopped for 30 minutes, 4 trains travel at low speed for some time, 1 train stops at a
station until the track is cleared as there is no vacant station to proceed to and only 1 train
resumes regular operation and reaches its destination without delay. Moreover, 2 trains
are cancelled (12 and 24 minutes after resumption of service), while 36 minutes after
resumption of service the first train is dispatched according to schedule. Scenarios of the
same type are studied for different earthquake magnitudes and epicentral distances.
Results are presented in terms of the following quantities:
* Firstorder delay, which is the aggregated delay time in minutes from all trains along the
line, ignoring propagation of delay effects. This corresponds to the delays
estimated in Chapters 6 and 7.
* Second order delay, which is the aggregated delay time in minutes from all trains along
the line, due to the fact that the trains are not able to proceed due to stopped or
delayed trains ahead. This second order delay does not include train cancellations.
* Third order delay, in number of trains as well as minutes, associated with train
cancellations.
Results are also presented in terms of correction factors of the first order delay if we
include second or both second and third order.
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Results in Terms of Minutes of Total Delay
Under the simplifying assumptions we have just described. we have found that
earthquakes of magnitudes 5 and 6 at distances 60, 100 and 140kmn from the track cause
only short delays (see Figure II-2), which can be compensated by increasing the speed of
trains after resumption of service. This is not the case for higher magnitudes. Table II-1
presents the delay results for distances D=60, 100 and 140km and earthquake magnitudes
7 and 8. Based on these results we conclude:
As the frequency of trains decreases, the total delay in terms of minutes along the line
decreases as well. This is true for all orders of delay, their aggregate sums and for the
number of cancelled trains. Moreover. total delays increase with earthquake magnitude.
This is consistently observed for the total delay time along the line, however the first and
second order delay times are sensitive to the location of trains along the line when they
are stopped by the SEWS. An interesting result is that the number of cancelled trains is
more sensitive to the frequency of trains than to earthquake magnitude and location.
Finally, the dispatching policy of trains which governs cancellations (3rd order delay), is
very significant in controlling the total delay time along the line.
Correction Factors of the First Order Delay
The correction factors of first order delay time to include second order or both second and
third order delays are presented in Table II-2. for various magnitudes and epicentral
distances. If one includes both types of delay propagation. there is at most a 4-fold
increase in the value of the first order delay while on average we observe a 2-fold
increase. If train cancellations are excluded, then the correction factor on the first order
delay is around 1.3 on average with a peak value of 1.6.
175
Order of 1 train per 1 train per I trains per 1 train per I train per I train per
Delay segment 2 segments 3 segments segment 2 segments 3 segments
D=60km M=7 M=8
1st 216 108 84 480 240 180
2nd 86 63 48 0 0 0
3rd(cancel) A (4) 384 (2) 192 0 (4) 384 (2) 192 0
lst+2nd 302 171 132 480 240 180
lst+2nd+3rd 686 363 132 864 432 180
.ii
D=10Okm M=7 M=8
1st 156 78 48 420 210 120
2nd 68 46 18 30 15 15
3rd(cancel)' (4) 384 0 0 (4) 384 (2) 192 0
lst+2nd 224 124 66 450 225 150
lst+2nd+3rd 608 124 66 834 417 150
D=140km M=7 M=8
1st 0 0 0 432 216 156
2nd 0 0 0 0 0 0
3rd(cancel)' 0 0 0 (4) 384 (2) 192 0
lst+2nd 0 0 0 432 216 156
lst+2nd+3rd 0 0 0 816 408 156
(I) in parentheses, the number of cancelled trains
Table I-1: Aggregate delay in terms of minutes for first. second and third order delays
along the line, for earthquakes of magnitudes 7 and 8 occurring at 60, 100 and
140km from the center point of the model line.
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Order of 1 train per 1 train per I trains per I train per 1 train per 1 train per
Delay segment 2 segments 3 segments segment 2 segments 3 segments
D=60km M=7M=8
incl 2nd 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0
incl. 2nd+3rd 3.2 3.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.0
D=10Okm M7 M8
incl. 2nd 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.2
incl. 2nd+3rd 3.9 1.6 1.4 2.0 2.0 1.2
D=1401km M=7 M=8
incl.2nd 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
incl.3rd 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.9 1.9 1.0
Table II-2: Factors of increase of the first order delay, after including second or both
second and third order delay, for earthquakes of magnitudes 7 and 8 occurring 60,
100 and 140kmn from the central point of the model line.
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POTENTIAL EPICENTERS OF EARTHQUAKES
with Respect to Model Line-1 train per segment
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Figure H-1: Model line, train and station locations and potential epicenters
of earthquakes used in the study of propagation of delay along the line
[Figure for train frequency of 1 train per segment]
178
UJ
._.I
-
_
msl
- - - - . - - -- - -- -- -- -1
DISTANCE FROM TRACK = 60km
Ainpl = 80gals - Ainsp2 = 120gals
/,
/ ,\
- ~~/
/ \ ,
/
/~~~~~~
/mi .. 
-. _
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15
Track Segment
DISTANCE FROM TRACK = 100km
Ainpl = 80gals - Ainsp2 = 20gals
200
180
160
_140
- 120
g0
100
C)w
c)
u 80
<s
= 60
0
( 40
a 20
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Track Segment
DISTANCE FROM TRACK = 140km
Ainpl = 80gals - Ainsp2 = 120gals
II IL-- L ... . ....- ._::_:...... __ 
~'''I_______L___
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 12 13 14 15 16
Track Segment
Figure II-2: Assumed recorded values of peak ground acceleration
along the model line for M = 5-8, compared to track inspection levels:
Ail=80gals and Ap 2=120gals, for epicentral distances:
(a) D=60km, (b) D=lOOkm and (c) D=l40km.
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Figure H-3: Train location versus time after resumption of service of trains
according to current track inspection levels: Ai.p-i=80gals and Aisp2 = 120gals.
for earthquake of M=7 at D=60km.
[1. Figure presents half the total track and half the trains due to symmetry,
2. Figure for train frequency of 1 train per segment]
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